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Money is vital for all terrorist organizations. For some organizations, it is a 
tool to achieve their goals; for others, it is the objective itself. Terrorists 
participate in organized crime activities at various levels. Organized crime expert 
Tamara Makarenko describes the nexus between organized crime groups and 
terrorist groups. This study expanded her continuum into understanding the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its evolution through the organization’s 
financial sources.  
Using this continuum, this study characterizes the PKK as a commercial 
terrorist group with strong financial motivations. Its financial motivations are 
stronger than its political ones. It originated as a pure terrorist organization 
sheltered by sponsoring states; meanwhile, it continuously improved its 
capabilities in criminal fields. To more easily conduct its criminal operations, its 
members maintain their deceptive political rhetoric. By UN standards, the 
organization can also be identified as a transnational organized crime group by 
considering the severity of its crimes and its criminal network across the Middle 
East, Turkey, and Europe.  
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A. THE SIGNIFICIANCE AND GOAL OF THE STUDY 
Terrorism is a major threat to world peace. The 9/11 attacks proved to the 
world that no country is immune to terrorism threats. Any country can be the 
victim of a terrorist attack at any time. Globalization has erased countries’ 
borders not only in communications, trade, and culture, but also with respect to 
terrorism threats. In the new terrorism age, the enemy is vague and the attacks 
are more lethal than they were in the past. 
Although there are many differences between past and contemporary 
terrorists, the fundamental need of every organization is the same: money. 
According to Steven Hutchinson, a criminologist from the University of Ottawa, 
and Pat O’Malley, a professor at the University of Sydney, terrorist organizations 
need money to provide funding for their continued operations and bribery, as well 
as for buying the loyalty of their own members and external sympathy.1 As an 
example, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) needs money, first, to fulfill the 
basic requirements of its members, such as shelter and food. Second, it needs 
money for its operational purposes like ammunition, weapons, education, 
transportation, and bribery. Third, it spends money for its perpetuity and 
legitimacy. It propagates via different platforms to influence people, recruit new 
members, and lobby. The illegal and secret spirit of the terrorists’ proceedings 
makes everything more expensive for terrorist organizations when they are 
compared with legal bodies.  
For law enforcement officers, it is usually difficult to get information from 
inside these organizations. Generally, members of terrorist organizations are 
strictly bound to each other. The members know that their comrades will severely 
retaliate against any betrayal to the organization. The organizations cannot 
                                            
1 Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on Some of the 
Links between Terrorism and Criminality,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 12 (December 
2007): 1101. 
 2 
endure without money, and they have to spend it for their expenses. Therefore, 
following the money flow is easier than infiltrating terrorist organizations.  
Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, professors at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), note that financial and material sources are “the 
lifeblood of terrorist operations.”2 They also point out that governments decided 
to attack the financial sources of terrorists to cease them. After the destruction of 
9/11, U. S. President George W. Bush signed an order to freeze “United States 
financial assets of, and prohibited United States’ transactions with, 27 different 
entities that included terrorist organizations, individual terrorist leaders, a 
corporation serving as a front for terrorism and several nonprofit organizations.”3 
President Bush publicly announced that “we will starve the terrorists of funding, 
turn them against each other, root them out of their safe hiding places and bring 
them to justice.”4 His description for the consequential results of cutting financial 
links is impressive. A military response is not enough—and sometimes counter-
productive—in the war against terrorism. The war must be carried in all possible 
ways against terrorism. Otherwise, the terrorist organizations regenerate 
themselves thanks to new recruitments and new sources. 
Terrorist groups benefit from a variety of sources. Michael Freeman, a 
professor at NPS, categorizes them into four groups: “state sponsorship, illegal 
activities, legal activities, and popular support.”5 Daniel Byman, a professor in the 
Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, notes that many terrorist 
groups had government backing in the 1970s and 1980s because supporting 
                                            
2 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “Introduction,” in Terrorism Financing and 
State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 1. 
3 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Executive Order 13224 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of State, September 23, 2001): 1. 
4 “Bush: We Will Starve the Terrorists,” CNN, September 24, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/index.html. 
5 Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 6 (Jun 2011), 465. 
 3 
terrorist groups to weaken a rival country was easier and cheaper than improving 
national armed capabilities.6 John Picarelli, an expert on transnational threats 
and homeland security from American University, and Louise Shelley, the 
founder and director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
(TraCCC), note that the end of the Cold War and international agreements 
decreased the amount of state sponsorship for terrorism. Therefore, many 
terrorist organizations shifted to organized crime to fill the gap of state 
sponsorship. The authors claim that environmental criminal opportunities, 
relationships with criminal groups, financial strength, and structure of terrorist 
organizations shape the terrorists’ level of involvement in crime.7 Freeman points 
out that terrorist organizations sometimes run legal enterprises to fund 
themselves. These businesses are generally cash-based trades. The cash-based 
operations give terrorists the opportunity to launder illegal money. Also, 
donations from a sympathetic population is another source of money and 
legitimacy for terrorist organizations.8  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the financial sources and 
organized crime links of terrorist organizations through a case study analysis. 
Turkey, a victim of PKK terrorism since 1979, has vast experience in countering 
it. Examining the PKK may reveal similarities between other terrorist 
organizations with respect to mutation phases and financial secrets. Peng Wang, 
a criminologist from King’s College, highlights that criminal and political groups 
learn a lot from each other. They collaborate and teach each other new tactics.9 
The best way to win against their enemy is to know the enemy as well as they 
                                            
6 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 1–5. 
7 John T. Picarelli and Louise I. Shelley, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” in Terrorism 
Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, eds. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold 
A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 40–41. 
8 Freeman, “Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 469–470. 
9 Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence,” Asian 
Social Science 6, no. 6 (Jun 2010, 2010), 1. 
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know themselves. Therefore, detailed research on the PKK’s financial sources 
can reveal many secrets about other terrorist organizations’ financial links. This 
research can help policy makers generate reliable counter-policies and 
strategies. Consequently, the thesis may help law enforcement administrations to 
diminish terrorist activities worldwide. 
There are three reasons for choosing the PKK as a case study. First, the 
PKK is a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Austria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Moldova, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines.10 However, it is disappointing to see that some countries and 
scholars still avoid naming the PKK’s activities as “terrorism” because of their 
political concerns. There are definitional deficiencies in the common description 
of terrorism, but the PKK’s criminal acts are undeniable. Margaret Thatcher, the 
prime minister of the United Kingdom between 1979 and 1990, highlighted the 
criminal side of terrorism. In 1981, she stated about the IRA prisoners that were 
seeking political status, “Crime is crime is crime. It is not political.”11  
Second, the PKK is a good example in which to observe all four kinds of 
financial sources that Freeman mentions. The organization initiated its operations 
using various countries’ sponsorship and eventually evolved to a transnational 
organized crime group. Glenn Curtis and Tara Karacan note, “The Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK)…is a Turkey-based terrorist organization with a substantial 
network that has engaged in terrorist and criminal activity, including narcotics and 
arms trafficking, in Turkey and Western Europe.”12 Regarding the Colombian 
                                            
10 “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” IHS Jane’s, accessed 02/03, 2015, 2. 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Referen
ce&ItemId=+++1320763&Pubabbrev=JWIT 
11 “On this Day 1950–2005, 3 October 1981: IRA Maze Hunger Strikes at an End,” BBC, 
accessed 11/30, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi 
/dates/stories/october/3/newsid_2451000/2451503.stm 
12 Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, 
Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2002), 1. 
 5 
cartel issue in 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that “organized crime 
is a threat to global security,” and he mobilized the entire U.S. government to 
fight against it.13 By recalling the remarks of Curtis and Karacan, one can claim 
that the PKK is no less of an organized crime organization than the Colombian 
drug cartels. The PKK has many traits of organized crime activities that are 
worthy of further research. 
Third, the PKK is one of the most dangerous and long-standing terrorist 
organizations in the world. Nevertheless, some scholars do not have much 
information about the PKK due to an inadequacy of studies in the English 
language. Therefore, the research may contribute some knowledge to the PKK 
area for future international studies.  
B. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
TERRORISM 
Terrorism is a controversial issue in the international arena. Every country 
or party describes it in accordance with its own goals and political concerns. The 
cliché of one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter mindset causes 
everlasting conflicts and instabilities. Beril Dedeoğlu, a political science professor 
from Galatasaray University,  argues that the international community has unified 
in the fight against terrorism and some states individually publish lists of terror 
criminals; however, the definitions of “terrorist, terrorism, terrorist organization”14 
are still vague and do not have a common understanding. She highlights that 
each state has its own terror criminals.15 Walter Laqueur, who is a historian and 
political observer in security studies, states,  
Governments and media in other countries do not wish to offend 
terrorists by calling them terrorists. The French and British press 
                                            
13 Roy Godson and Phil Williams, “Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime,” 
Survival 40, no. 3 (1998), 79. 
14 Beril Dedeoğlu, “Bermuda Triangle: Comparing Official Definitions of Terrorist Activity,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 3 (2003), 103. 
15 Ibid., 103. 
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would not dream of referring to their countries’ native terrorists by 
any other name but call terrorists in other nations militants, 
activists, national liberation fighters, or even ‘gun persons’.16  
Due to conflicting interests, it does not seem that countries will reach a 
consensus about the definition of terrorism in the near future. 
Leaving the political side of terrorist groups behind and focusing on 
criminality may be the best way to improve a collective stance against terrorism. 
Because other than having a sponsoring state, most terrorist groups acquire 
money by involving in organized criminal activities at various levels. Maintaining 
the rule of law and punishing criminals are the fundamental responsibilities of 
every modern state. It can be easier for countries to meet on the grounds of 
preventing crimes. The United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, which was signed by 185 countries and ratified by 147 
countries, defines organized crime as,  
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of 
time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this 
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit.17  
According to the Convention, a serious crime is any criminal activity that 
has at least four years’ prison punishment. The third article of the Convention 
compiles a list to clarify the nature of transnational crimes. First, “it is committed 
in more than one State;” second, “it is committed in one state but a substantial 
part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another 
State;” third, “it is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal 
group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State;” fourth, “it is 
committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.”18  
                                            
16 Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 1996, 1996), 
3. 
17 United Nations, United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the Protocols thereto (New York: United Nations, 2004), Article 2. 
18 Ibid., Article 3. 
 7 
There are many studies that mention the nexus of organized crime and 
terrorism. Organized crime groups use terror tactics, and terrorists involve in 
organized crime to finance their expenditures. Hutchinson and O’Malley provide 
an overview of the collaboration of terrorist and criminal organizations. They 
classify the crime-terror nexus into two groups: “ephemeral-sporadic” and 
“organized-enduring.”19 Terrorist groups’ involvement level in organized crime is 
directly related to their operational purposes. For the ephemeral-sporadic 
collaborations, the authors mention “profit-for-violence cells,”20 which adopt low-
risk and low-profit criminal activities to generate enough funds for their limited 
attacks. However, organized-enduring collaborations emerge with the need for 
trust and self-funding. According to Hutchinson and O’Malley, terrorist groups 
may either develop a “parasitical” relationship with organized criminal groups or 
they can create their own criminal “infrastructures.”21 
Dr. Tamara Makarenko, an expert on organized crime and terrorism,   
draws a line to represent different levels of collaboration between organized 
crime groups and terrorist groups (see Figure 1). According to her, there are four 
levels in the terror and organized crime continuum. The first level of cooperation 
is “alliance.” Organized crime groups and terrorist groups collaborate for short 
terms to acquire mutual benefits. In such a collaboration, organized crime groups 
seek political instability in order to pressure law enforcement officials and 
diminish the probability of a counter international cooperation. Terrorist groups 
also want political instability to harm the popularity of governments.22 To explain 
the second level, in which “operational motivations” come forward, Makarenko 
points out “criminal groups using terrorism as an operational tool, and terrorist 
                                            
19 Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley, “A Crime–Terror Nexus? Thinking on some of the 
Links between Terrorism and Criminality,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 12 (2007), 
1099–1101. 
20 Ibid., 1099. 
21 Ibid., 1102. 
22 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between 
Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 (2004), 131–132. 
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groups taking part in criminal activities as an operational tool.”23 Criminal 
organizations want to kill public officials, journalists, and their rivals. The basic 
motivation is strengthening their influence on the market for “illicit profit-
maximization.”24 Terrorist groups aim to acquire funds for their operations. The 
remarkable point is that terrorist and criminal groups both change their traditional 
organization and establish their own structures instead of cooperating with each 
other. At the third level of the continuum, “convergence,”25 the diverse 
organizations meet almost in the middle of the line. Both terrorist and criminal 
organizations have similar properties, and they can change themselves into the 
opposite organization. The convergence is the level of “hybrids”26 in which an 
organized crime group has the ability to turn itself into a terrorist organization, 
and a terrorist organization has the same capability. At the convergence point, 
the goals of organizations are difficult to distinguish. Makarenko notes that 
criminal groups have political goals, and terrorist groups have criminal profits. 
Terrorists use their political side as a mask behind which to conceal their illicit 
profit.27 In the fourth and final level, which is called the “black hole”28 situation, 
political criminal and commercial terrorist hybrids of the third level further 
advance their presence. They create safe havens for themselves either by 
controlling a territory or a state. Makarenko points out that neither group wants 
stability or victory because the continuation of problems serve several 
opportunities for them to carry on their illicit profit making operations.29   
                                            
23 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational 
Organised Crime and Terrorism,” 133. 
24 Ibid., 133. 
25 Ibid., 135. 
26 Ibid., 135. 
27 Ibid., 135. 
28 Ibid., 138. 
29 Ibid., 140. 
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Figure 1.  The Crime-Terror Continuum 
 
Source: Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay 
between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 
(February 2004), 131. 
In his article on hybrid criminal organizations, Santiago Ballina tries 
Makarenko’s continuum on two different terrorist organizations, La Familia 
Michoacana and the Abu Sayyaf group. By considering their operations, sources, 
political and religious agendas, and social environments, he thinks of them as 
hybrid organizations. He points out that the two-dimensional organized crime and 
terrorism continuum, though a good starting point, is not flexible enough to 
explain shifting strategies and tactics of hybrid organizations.30 He notes that 
“kinship and territorial belonging”31 are also important factors in the emergence 
of violent groups, so he suggests a three-dimensional model (see Figure 2). This 
model comprises profit, ideology, and social environment dimensions that are 
overlapped with each other. Although the three-dimensional model is innovative 
in explaining the social perspective of hybrid organizations to improve 
governments’ counter-terrorist policies, it is not a useful tool in classifying violent 
groups.32 
                                            
30 Santiago Ballina, “The Crime–terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid 
Criminal Organisations,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 6, no. 2 (2011), 
130. 
31 Ibid., 130. 
32 Ibid., 132. 
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Figure 2.  Crime-Terror Continuum on a Three-Dimensional Model  
 
Source: Santiago Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for 
the Study of Hybrid Criminal Organisations,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and 
Counter Terrorism 6, no. 2 (10/01; 2015/05, 2011), 131. 
C. BASIC KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE PKK 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was founded in 1978 to establish a 
Marxist-Leninist Kurdish state in eastern Turkey. It started its terrorist attacks in 
1984. In the past three decades, it has caused the deaths of more than 5,687 
civilians, 6,653 security officials, and 19,946 PKK terrorists.33 It carried out more 
than 20,000 violent attacks on civilians and government officials. As a result of 
this, 386,360 people have left their lands and migrated to Turkey’s western cities 
or European capitals.34 The cost of fighting terrorism is high for a developing 
country like Turkey. Servet Mutlu, an economics professor from Başkent 
University, estimates that from 1984 to 2005, PKK terrorism cost 88.1 billion 
USD, consisting of 54.2 billion USD in direct costs and 33.9 billion in indirect 
                                            
33 Habib Özdemir and İlker Pekgözlü, “Where do Terror Organizations Get their Money? A 
Case Study: Financial Resources of the PKK,” International Journal of Security and Terrorism 3, 
no. 2 (2012), 86. 
34 İnönü Akgün Alp, “Terörün Ekonomik Etkileri “ [The economic effects of terror] 
Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Terörizm Dergisi 4, no. 5 (2013), 6. 
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costs.35 However, Turkish government representatives think that the cost is 
closer to 1 trillion USD with the cost of missed opportunities in the last 30 years is 
factored in.  
The leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured in Kenya in 
1999 by Turkish Special Forces. Since that time, he has been imprisoned on 
Imrali Island in Turkey. Murat Karayılan has been leading the armed wing of the 
organization since Abdullah Öcalan’s capture. The terrorist organization’s 
operational head is currently based in the Kandil Mountains in the north of Iraq. 
The PKK has evolved in many aspects over thirty years. According to 
Lyubov Mincheva, a professor of political science at the University of Sofia, and 
Ted Robert Gurr, a professor from the University of Maryland, it was a Marxist-
Leninist organization mixed with Kurdish nationalism. Then, the Kurdish 
nationalism became dominant, and it focused on a separate Kurdish state. The 
ideals shifted to an autonomous state in the 1990s, and in the 2000s, the 
organization started promoting the ideal of a truly democratic Turkey.36 The 
terrorist organization changed its name many times to avoid legal regulations 
restricting its financial and political activities. In 2002, it started using the name 
Kongra Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan (KADEK), Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress. In 2003, it called itself Kongra Gele Kurdistan (KONGRA-
GEL), the Kurdistan People’s Congress. Later, in 2005, it returned to its original 
name, the PKK.37 The U.S. State Department announced on November 14, 
2003,  
Through its recent actions, the Kurdistan Workers Party/Kurdistan 
Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK/KADEK) appears to be 
making an effort to evade responsibility for its terrorist acts by 
changing its name. The PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist 
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36 Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva and Ted Robert Gurr, Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: 
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organization, and no name change or press release can alter that 
fact.38 
Many countries including the European Union, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Austria, Azerbaijan, Iraq, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Moldova, New Zealand, and the Philippines 
designated the PKK as a terrorist organization.39 
Turkish law enforcement units and the Turkish military have succeeded in 
the years-long counter-terrorism campaign; however, the organization has 
resurrected several times. After the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the 
Turkish Government adopted social, cultural, and economic reforms. However, 
the PKK continued its attacks. Mustafa Coşar Ünal notes, “The PKK perceived 
Turkey’s effort toward the removal of certain grievances (granting linguistic and 
cultural rights) as losing its societal support and responded to it with increased 
violence to underline that these reforms were never sufficient for its cause.”40 
Although the terrorist group wants to show itself as the representative body of 
ethnic Kurdish people, Michael Radu states that, “in reality, the organization is 
not representative of the Kurdish people, nor is it nationalist in any commonly 
understood sense.”41  
In late 2012, the Turkish government initiated negotiation talks with the 
PKK to completely end the years-long conflict. Ünal points out that “the 
government took a new stance from a conflict resolution perspective called the 
Peace/Resolution Process…and this process was publicly announced at the 
                                            
38 U.S. Department of State, “Kurdistan Workers Party/Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy 
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14, 2003). 
39 Ibid., 2. 
40 Mustafa Cosar Unal, “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Popular Support: 
Counterterrorism towards an Insurgency Nature,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (Jul 
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41 Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis 45, no. 1 (2001), 51. 
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Nevruz 2013 Celebration in Diyarbakır province in a message from Öcalan.”42 
For nearly two years, the parliamentarians of the Peoples’ Democratic Party 
(HDP), which is a pro-PKK party, distributed messages between the government 
officials and the jailed terrorist, Öcalan. The government hoped to end the violent 
campaign by encouraging the PKK to disarm its members. On February 28, 
2015, the representatives of the pro-PKK HDP and the government 
representatives held a public meeting in Dolmabahçe Palace to declare their 
decision to further progress the talks. During the time approaching the Nevruz 
celebrations, the government expected a disarmament call from the PKK’s jailed 
leader and its operational leaders. However, the declaration, which was read on 
behalf of Abdullah Öcalan during the celebrations on March 21, 2015, was vague 
and did not include any call for democracy and disarmament. The Turkish 
president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expressed his discontent by saying, “If we 
look into the text, one can see that most of the topics there do not have anything 
to do with democracy. There are still new demands arising.”43 After the June 
2015 elections, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority 
in the parliament. By contrast, the pro-PKK party gained 80 seats in the 550-seat 
Turkish National Grand Assembly. Becoming one of the four major parties, it 
acquired the capability to form a coalition government with the AKP.   Before and 
after the election, the HDP announced several times that it would not join in a 
coalition with the AKP. At the same time, the PKK restarted its brutal campaign 
after a two-year silence or preparation period.  
The PKK has had three main financial sources since its establishment in 
1978: state sponsors, illegal trade and activities, and legal businesses. Moyara 
Ruehsen, a professor of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 
Monterey, discusses that the state sponsorship is a debatable issue because it 
                                            
42 Mustafa Cosar Unal, “Strategist or Pragmatist: A Challenging Look at Ocalan’s 
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BBC Monitoring European Mar 24, 2015, 2015b. 
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may be in various ways by sheltering, training, funding, assisting, providing 
weapons, or “turning a blind eye to the group’s activities.”44  Mincheva and Gurr 
list Syria, Iran, Iraq, USSR (Russia), Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Italy among the countries that helped the PKK in different degrees.45 Mitchel 
Roth and Murat Sever, criminal justice professors from Sam Houston State 
University, add Greek Cypriots, Armenia, Libya, Bulgaria, and Cuba to the 
aforementioned sponsoring state list.46  However, Michael Freeman writes that 
state funding is not a reliable source for terrorist groups because the sponsoring 
states try to impose their own ambitions, or at least want the group to give the 
sponsor’s goals priority. Sponsoring states may want terrorist groups to harm or 
leave alone some significant communities or groups. If the sponsors find a 
diplomatic way to reach their goal, they can easily abandon their terrorist 
collaborators.47 Therefore, the PKK has established alternative ways to raise 
funds. Habib Özdemir and İlker Pekgözlü, professors from the Turkish National 
Police Academy, list the PKK’s major financial sources other than state 
sponsorship: “narcotics, human trafficking, arms smuggling, mass media, money 
laundering, extortion, ransom, membership fees at business and cultural 
activities, and abusing the utilities of the United Nation’s Makhmour Refugee 
Camp.”48 Considering the criminal operations of the PKK, Mincheva and Gurr 
note: 
We analyze the PKK as an opportunistic movement, blending 
ideological sectarianism with the pragmatic objectives of profit 
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maximization and risk reduction in illicit trans-border business 
activities. The PKK is a hybrid terror-crime network, one of the few 
that currently operates across Europe, for which political and 
economic objectives count equally, especially in its most recent 
activities.49   
Freeman notes “since money is the lifeblood of terrorist organizations, 
attacking it in better and smarter ways will result in a more effective fight against 
terrorism overall.” If one considers money as the organization’s lifeblood as he 
suggests, it is not easy to discover its metaphorical veins and arteries and predict 
the total amount of flow. General Ergin Saygun’s statement in 2008, who was 
then the Deputy of Turkish General Staff, may provide an overview for the level 
of the PKK’s fund raising operations and what we are facing. Saygun, in his 
statement, says that the PKK’s annual revenue changes between 400 and 500 
million Euros. Within this context, the drug business is the most lucrative 
business for the PKK, providing it 200–250 million Euros. It obtains 100–150 
million Euros from smuggling, 15–20 million Euros from enforced donations and 
20–25 million Euros from other activities.50 Because of the secret structure of its 
operations, there are contradicting numbers about the PKK’s annual budget; 
however, the main criminal funding methods of the organization are drug trade, 
extortion, human smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and money laundering. The 
legal businesses and institutions of the PKK or PKK sympathizers are used as 
covers for their illegal activities and money laundering operations.  
West Sands Advisory, which is led by Tamara Makarenko, points out the 
importance of financial combat against the PKK. It argues that military attacks 
cannot succeed without tight financial controls over the PKK. It also notes, “in 
order to cut off financing a concerted effort should be taken in the field of OC 
[organized crime] and terrorism; it is simply counterproductive to view terrorism in 
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News Mar 13, 2008. 
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one part of the world as disconnected from OC in another.”51 Roy Godson and 
Phil Williams, professors at Georgetown University, mark the importance of 
collective action against terrorism by noting:  
As transnational organized crime has become ubiquitous, devising 
and implementing effective counter measures has become an 
international  security imperative. Independent national responses 
will not suffice. As  long as transnational criminal organizations 
structure their operations in ways which limit the effectiveness of 
initiatives by any single state, the response needs to be extensive 
in scope, multilateral in form and, to the extent possible, global in 
reach.52 
The end of the Cold War resulted in the transformation of terror 
organizations. They mutated from state-sponsored to self-funding organizations. 
Extortion and the trade of drugs, humans, and cigarettes became their new 
financial sources. The collaboration and competition in this illicit market led both 
the criminal and terrorist groups to reorganize their structures to gain more profit 
and maximize their security. Makarenko illuminates that cooperation between 
crime and terror groups may be on various levels. Ballina points out the 
importance of social and cultural environments in strengthening this relationship. 
With an ethno-nationalist political rhetoric, the PKK is a good example of hybrid 
organizations and “commercial terrorists.”53 The criminal links and operations of 
the PKK in several countries make it a transnational security problem. However, 
in the thirty years since its inception, the PKK has maintained its earnings and 
status by causing instability and conflict in Turkey and Europe. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
By considering Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum, I hypothesize that the 
PKK is a “commercial terrorism”54 group. Behaving as the representative of 
ethno-Kurdish people in Turkey is its tactic to mask its criminal operations. The 
organization uses an ethno-nationalist political rhetoric to justify its terrorist acts, 
to gain popular support, and to recruit more expendable people to its criminal 
operations. The organization employs terrorism as a tool to suppress the ethno-
Kurdish people and governmental officials. The PKK terrorists want instability 
and conflict on their trade route to carry on their business from Iran to European 
countries.  
Exploring and then minimizing the financial sources of the PKK is the best 
way to combat against it. However, the transnational characteristic of the 
organization requires international cooperation and new collective counter-
measures. The PKK is not a problem only in the Turkey-Iran-Iraq triangle. It is 
also a major threat in European countries because it controls the illegal markets 
there and degrades state authorities. Therefore, weakening the organization will 
be more beneficial to European countries than Turkey.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question and test the hypothesis, the study begins 
by exploring the similarities and differences between organized crime groups and 
terrorist groups. Later, it concentrates on the crime-terror continuum or other 
possible models that can help understand the nexus between the two groups. 
The clandestine mechanisms of terrorist and organized crime groups are 
obstacles to clear the blurring line between them. Therefore, discovering the 
money sources is crucial to understanding at what level criminal and terrorist 
organizations are conceptually alike. For example, state sponsorship helps 
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establish many terrorist organizations before they can fund themselves. As they 
involve in the criminal world, they diversify their sources.  
This research is a single case study about PKK terrorism. To provide 
objectivity and plurality of opinions, it is based on numerous primary and 
secondary sources from academia, government, and media. The primary 
sources are official documents of Turkey, the United States, the European Union, 
Interpol, and the United Nations. There are many informative reports and 
documents about the criminal actions of the PKK. The secondary sources are 
books, journal articles, newspapers, and online sources. At some points, online 
sources of the PKK are also used because they provide official statements from 
the terrorist organization. However, they are not reliable because the 
organization frequently changes names and web addresses. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with background information about the crime-terror 
nexus and the PKK. The first chapter is as follows: the significance and goal of 
the study, preliminary knowledge about the finances of terrorist groups and the 
PKK, potential explanations and hypothesis, research design and sources, and 
thesis overview.  
The second chapter reviews the organized crime and terrorism definitions 
and their similarities and differences. Later, the phases of Makarenko’s crime-
terror continuum are explained one-by-one. After the general theoretical context, 
the PKK is discussed as a case study, and its position on the crime-terror 
continuum is considered.  
In the following two chapters, the financial relations of the PKK are 
explained in order to provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis. The 
third chapter of the study focuses on state sponsorship. State sponsorship is still 
a serious political obstacle for international security. The PKK started its activities 
as a pure terrorist organization acting on behalf of its sponsors. Therefore, one 
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can state that the PKK is the result of conflicting interests among allies and a 
power struggle among rivals. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the PKK’s contemporary financial sources, 
which it achieved over time through involvement in organized crime. These 
include drug trade, extortion, robbery, human trafficking for several purposes, 
arms smuggling, cigarette smuggling, and money laundering. 
The fifth chapter concludes with the knowledge gained through the study. 
It includes recommendations to combat against hybrid organizations. Finally, it 
closes with thoughts on current events and potential future political situations. 
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II. THE COMPARISON OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERROR 
A. THE OPPOSITE ENDS OF A CONTINUUM 
To improve effective responses to terrorism and organized crime, it is 
necessary to understand the definitions of organized crime and terrorism in a 
legal context. John Picarelli, a social science analyst at the U.S. National Institute 
of Justice, points out that the definitions of organized crime and terrorism can 
refer to a kind of organization, a kind of activity, or a combination of organization 
and activity.55 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime 
as: 
Any group having some manner of a formalized structure and 
whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal 
activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of 
actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or 
extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in 
their locales, region, or the country as a whole.56   
By considering Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1961 (1), the 
FBI lists two groups of crimes as federal and state crimes. These crimes include:  
[Federal crimes] bribery, sports bribery, counterfeiting, 
embezzlement of union funds, mail fraud, wire fraud, money 
laundering, obstruction of justice, murder for hire, drug trafficking, 
prostitution, sexual exploitation of children, alien smuggling, 
trafficking in counterfeit goods, theft from interstate shipment, and 
interstate transportation of stolen property. State crimes [consist of] 
murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 
and drugs.57  
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Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, these 
crimes may have extended penalties if they are committed by an organized crime 
group. 
Ongoing political and military conflicts, uncontrolled territories of weak 
states, globalization, and the technological advancements of the new millennium 
helped organized crime groups to acquire transnational characteristics. 
Therefore, the United Nations saw organized crime as a “global challenge”58 and 
decided to respond accordingly. In December 2000, the United Nations opened 
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto for signing. The protocol describes an organized crime group 
as: 
A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of 
time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more 
serious crimes or offences [an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty] 
… in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit.59 
According to this convention, organized crime can become transnational 
under four conditions: if “it is committed in more than one state; in one state but a 
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in 
another state; in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages 
in criminal activities in more than one state; or in one state but has substantial 
effects in another state.”60  
Compared to how it defined organized crime, the international community 
has not been as successful in defining terrorism. Dedeoğlu notes that several 
states have defined terrorism in their own legal systems; however, the 
international community is desperate to find a common definition for the century’s 
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biggest security threat.61 This is because the political aspect of terrorism shelters 
terrorists. There are political and conceptual differences between countries, 
which hinder crafting a common definition. Therefore, states generally define 
terrorism in accordance with their domestic concerns. The U.S. Code explains 
terrorism as:  
Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States of any State … [if it] appears 
to be intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to 
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.62  
The European Union defines terrorism through a long list of violent 
actions, but the focal point is the context of actions that  
may seriously damage a country or an international organization 
where committed with the aim of: (i) seriously intimidating a 
population, or (ii) unduly compelling a Government or international 
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or (iii) 
seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an 
international organization.63 
The Turkish Anti-Terror Law, which was ratified in 1991, gives a detailed 
picture of how Turkey perceives domestic terror. It states that  
Any act committed by an individual or individuals belonging to an 
organization with a view to change the constitutionally determined 
characteristics of the Republic and the political, legal, social, 
secular and economic order through oppression, violence, 
intimidation or threat; to destroy the indivisible territorial and 
national integrity of the State or to endanger the existence of the 
Turkish State and Republic; to weaken or take over state authority; 
to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms; to disrupt domestic 
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or external security as well as public order and health, is an act of 
terror.64 
There are some dissimilarities between organized crime groups and 
terrorist groups, and also some shared qualities. This chapter focuses on these 
points, respectively. Thomas Sanderson, the deputy director of the Transnational 
Threats Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington, DC, points out two dissimilarities between the groups. First, 
organized crime groups and terrorists have different doctrines and motivations. 
Organized crime groups concentrate on maximizing their material profit as if they 
are running a legal business; by contrast, terrorist groups have political or 
religious agendas. In accordance with their ideologies, they may want to remove 
a regime, separate a territory from a state, establish a free regime of their own, or 
bring attention to their grievances.65   
Second, organized crime groups usually avoid attracting attention from 
law enforcement, the press, and the public. Unwanted attention puts the 
organization in danger and may reveal their clandestine proceedings. In contrast, 
terrorist groups want media coverage.66 Media coverage seems to be the best 
and cheapest way for them to attract attention to their motives. Brian M. Jenkins, 
an expert on terrorism, notes, “Terrorism is theater, terrorists want a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead.”67 Thanks to big headlines and flashy news, 
which work as free advertisements for terrorist organizations, a terrorist 
organization indirectly succeeds in employing violence. It can frighten people, 
even in remote and unrelated areas. Also, by attracting public attention to its 
                                            
64 Terörle Mücadele Kanunu (Anti-Terror Law) (Translated by Beril Dedeoğlu), Pu L. No. 
3713, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), 20843 Mükerrer (Repeated) (December 4, 1991): 1. 
65 Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” 
SAIS Review of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (2004), 55. 
66 Ibid., 55. 
67 Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008), 
101. 
 25 
existence and motivation, they can draw in new recruits and affect the policies of 
a state. 
Ibrahim Üney, from the Turkish National Police Department, argues that 
there are three more distinctions: First, terrorists want to be recognized by a legal 
body as legitimate. They also want to be recognized as the defenders of their 
causes. Therefore, they mostly assume responsibility for their assaults soon after 
they are committed. On the other side, organized crime groups deny their actions 
and want to maintain their secrecy.  
Second, organized crime groups support and finance some political 
parties so that they can lobby for the groups’ rights. Nevertheless, terrorist 
groups have their own political wings. They use them to propagate, provoke 
crowds, and organize demonstrations or rebellions. Organized crime leaders 
establish legal enterprises and donate generous amounts to charities and funds. 
By doing so, they can easily disguise themselves among the public as being 
legitimate businessmen, philanthropists, or friends of influential figures.  
Third, Üney points out the difference between the victims of the two 
groups. Terrorists apply violence against innocent people. Their affected group is 
the general public. The victims are symbolic. The terrorists want to influence the 
behaviors and beliefs of the public. By contrast, organized crime groups choose 
their victims. There is generally a close social or financial relationship between 
the victim and the perpetrator.68 
Beyond being illegal, organized crime and terrorist groups have many 
similarities. Üney points out the similarities in their hierarchical structures, 
organizational properties, operations, and activities. Both organizations have 
pyramidal chains-of-command. Due to their criminal proceedings, secrecy is 
essential. Foot soldiers do not know much about the whole body of the 
organization, and they learn sensitive knowledge as they are promoted in rank. 
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The leaders require absolute obedience and fidelity from their followers. This last 
characteristic is less common in organized crime groups; still, in general, both 
groups develop cell-type bodies to maintain their secrecy and perpetuity.69 
Sanderson provides a list of bullet points that summarizes the similarities 
between the two groups. According to his research:  
• Both are generally rational actors. 
• Both use extreme violence and the threat of reprisals. 
• Both use kidnappings, assassinations, and extortion. 
• Both operate secretly, though at times publicly in friendly 
territory. 
• Both defy the state and the rule of law (except when there is 
state sponsorship). 
• For a member to leave either group is rare and often fatal. 
• Both present an asymmetrical threat to the United States 
and “friendly” nations. 
• Both can have “interchangeable” recruitment pools. 
• Both are highly adaptable, innovative and resilient. 
• Both have back-up leaders and foot soldiers. 
• Both have provided social services, though this is much 
more frequently seen with terrorist groups.70 
The main goal of this paper is to understand criminal and terrorist 
organizations that embody most of these similarities. Not a complete organized 
crime group, nor a terrorist group, but the ones in the middle, the hybrids, are the 
biggest security and financial threat.  
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B. HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS 
There is a common understanding that terrorists have ideological agendas 
to challenge state policies, and criminals seek profit. This seems true at first 
glance. However, the groups are not much different from each other in criminal 
proceedings. Both of them need money and apply violence. Terrorists are 
experienced in violent methods, but they crave money. By contrast, organized 
criminals have vast experience in illegal finance, but they need to more 
frequently utilize violence to maintain their profits. Because of their mutual need 
for knowledge and experience, terrorist organizations and organized crime 
groups converge at various relevant levels. Tamara Makarenko points out the 
levels of symbiosis by showing them on a Crime-Terror Continuum.  
Figure 3.  The Crime-Terror Continuum 
 
Source: Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Modelling 21st 
Century Security Dynamics” (PhD diss., University of Wales, 2005), 187. 
Using this continuum, Makarenko describes four different levels of 
relationship between terrorists and organized criminals: (1) alliance, (2) 
operational motivations, (3) convergence, and (4) black hole.  
1. Alliance 
Alliance is the basic level of cooperation. The alliances may last for a short 
or long time. During this term, organized crime and terrorist groups mutually 
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benefit from each other. Terrorist groups strongly desire to learn financial issues 
such as how to smuggle, money-launder, or counterfeit documents. Organized 
criminals cooperate with terrorists to acquire protection or create political 
instability.71 This is because, in a situation of instability and insecurity, law 
enforcement units primarily focus on terrorism, which the units perceive to be 
more threatening than organized crime. By doing so, organized criminals bring 
the attention to terrorists while they operate freely. They can call their terrorist 
collaborators to threaten politicians and law enforcement officials. 
2. Operational Tool 
The alliance phase is a form of collaboration, where each side does what 
it knows best. Terrorists create fear and organized criminals earn money. By 
contrast, Makarenko defines the second phase as “criminal groups using 
terrorism as an operational tool and terrorist groups taking part in criminal 
activities as an operational tool.”72 After learning new methods from each other in 
the alliance phase, both organizations achieve their own financial or political 
capabilities to obtain organizational security. This is because depending on 
another organization makes these illegal bodies highly vulnerable to intelligence 
operations. Behzat Ekici, Phil Williams, and Ayhan Akbulut note that organized 
criminals and terrorists end their mutual partnerships for two reasons: First, 
terrorists easily adapt their substructures not to rely on others for criminal and 
trafficking organizations; second, criminal groups mostly pay tax to terrorists, and 
paying tax diminishes their competitiveness in the drug market by increasing the 
costs.73  Chris Dishman, a researcher for the U.S. Commission on National 
Security, argues that organized crime groups employ a “selective and calibrated 
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violence to destroy competitors or threaten counternarcotic authorities.”74 He 
adds that a criminal organization with terrorist capabilities can “force the 
government leniency and negotiation.”75   
3. Convergence 
At the third level, convergence, organized crime and terrorist groups 
acquire hybrid characteristics. Justine A. Rosenthal, executive editor of The 
National Interest, points out that terrorist groups are highly skillful in complying 
with new conditions; “terrorist groups are not black boxes; they are organic 
organizations-capable of evolution and adaptation.”76 Makarenko points out that 
each organization has the ability to shift the nature of its structural body, which is 
at the opposite end of the crime-terror continuum. A terrorist organization can 
turn itself into an organized crime group, or an organized crime group can 
transform into a terrorist one. Makarenko introduces two new terms: political 
crime and commercial terrorism.77    
a. Political Crime Group 
According to Makarenko, the political crime hybrids emerge when criminal 
organizations seek political objectives as well as material profit. These kinds of 
hybrid groups carry the qualifications of both terrorist and transnational organized 
crime groups. Like a traditional terrorist group, they have cell-type networks. 
They abandon their centralized-hierarchical structures and become more flexible 
in accommodating sudden changes. Their cadres have more expertise on crime. 
Their leaderships are easily replaceable. They can easily exploit economic and 
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political weaknesses in countries. Makarenko highlights that political crime 
groups generally try to build “an alternative or parallel government.”78     
b. Commercial Terrorism 
The second type of hybrids is commercial terrorists. As mentioned before, 
terrorist organizations want to validate their existence in case they lose their 
sponsors. Therefore, achieving self-funding mechanisms through criminal 
activities is their primary goal. Makarenko notes that criminal terrorism groups 
give organized crime equal or more priority than their terrorist activities. 
Considering the activities of several organizations such as the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army/ Colombia (ELN), 
Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, Abu Sayyaf, and Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU), the criminal activities mostly include kidnapping; extortion; 
drug trade; smuggling arms, diamonds, and contraband goods; and human 
trafficking.79   
Rosenthal specifically searched the mutations of terrorist groups, which 
moved from the right side towards the left of Makarenko’s continuum. She sees 
these kinds of hybrids as “armed entrepreneurs” and names their activity as “for-
profit-terrorism.” These hybrids use their respective ideologies as a mask. 
Rosenthal argues that, even though a ‘for-profit-terrorist organization’ loses its 
political motivation and turns to a pure criminal one, it keeps its political rhetoric 
to legitimize its crimes, attract new recruits, and as a leverage to negotiate with 
the state authorities. They also cannot quit terrorism. This is because they 
employ it to oppress local populations and alienate them from the government.80  
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4. Black Hole Syndrome 
The focal point of convergence for terrorists and organized crime groups is 
the black hole. Political crime or commercial terrorism hybrids aim to control 
territory in order to create safe havens for their perpetuity. Makarenko gives two 
ways for them to achieve their goals: first, the sides of a civil war convert their 
political objectives into criminal ones; second, criminal or terrorist hybrids take 
the control of a state. In each way, the territory turns into a lawless zone and 
provides fertile ground for criminal business. The black hole syndrome causes 
two types of problems, each of which affect global security: failed or criminal 
states. She sees Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, North Korea, Sierra Leone, 
Tajikistan, and some areas in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Thailand as a 
consequence of this syndrome.81   
C. THE PKK’S PLACE ON THE CONTINUUM   
François Haut, from the Paris Institute of Criminology, argues that the PKK 
is among the most active and dangerous of mutating terrorist groups.82 The 
mutation of the organization can be seen through the first three phases of 
Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum. Although there is not much scholarship 
about the PKK’s transformation, it can best be observed by considering the 
changes in its relations and financial sources. Rosenthal describes three 
situations that accelerate the mutation of terrorist organizations: (1) a change in 
leadership, (2) a change of ideology, or (3) high amounts of illicit income.83 After 
losing their founding leaders, successors may follow old principles and policy. By 
contrast, the loss may also trigger the political dissolution of group’s ideology, 
and new leaders may create the new pillars of profit maximization. Second, the 
ideology of the organization may become outdated. Therefore, the group shifts its 
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priorities from ideology to profit. Third, high amounts of revenue may corrupt 
high-ranking leaders. They inadventantly find that their priorities are no longer 
political. The second and third options are more relevant to the PKK’s 
transformation from a terrorist to a hybrid organization. 
The leader of the PKK, Öcalan, initiated the organization into the illicit 
market after its establishment in 1978. Therefore, his incarceration in 1999 did 
not change anything about the PKK’s financial methods. His successor has 
continued and improved the organization. After the downfall of the USSR, the 
organization noticed that Marxist discourse no longer attracks members. Such 
discourse is old-fashioned and contrary to the popular beliefs of people, which 
the PKK exploits as its recruitement pool. Chris Dishman notes that “Terrorists 
and guerrilla groups who view their cause as futile, might turn their formidable 
assets towards crime—all the while under a bogus political banner. Other groups 
might turn to organized crime if their raison d’être evaporates in the face of 
negotiation or peace.”84 The organization removed the hammer and sickle from 
its so-called banners in the early 1990s. In the same decade, it concentrated on 
maximizing its profit, and revenue thrived with the guidance of Kurdish drug 
lords. In the early 2000s, as an example of Rosenthal’s third point, the revenue of 
the organization has become so big that nobody can refuse participating in its 
criminal activities. The main goal of the organization has shifted to profit-
maximization, and it has employed terror in several ways as a tool in complement 
to that shift.   
1. Pure Terrorism Period 
In 1978, the PKK started its activities as a pure terrorist organization. 
Ünal, from the Turkish National Police Academy, notes that the initial goal of the 
PKK was to establish an ‘Independent United Kurdish State’ by separating 
territories from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. As with many other terrorist 
organizations after the 1950s, its ideology was based on Marxist-Leninist 
                                            
84 Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” 56. 
 33 
principles. Its leadership maintained its Stalinistic rule (top-down, centralized, and 
hierarchical) for years. Inspired by the Cubans, the terrorists adopted Maoist 
strategy in their attacks.85 Even though the PKK had stated in its establishment 
resolution that it would fight against Iran, Iraq, and Syria, it did not do anything 
with them other than collaborate. It merely chose to struggle against the most 
democratic and free country among them, which has also been a member of 
NATO since 1952. One can argue that the PKK found many sponsors at the 
time, as it was a proxy during the Cold War. The third chapter discusses, in 
detail, the chronology of state sponsorship for the PKK.   
In the 1980s, the leader of the organization, Abdullah Ocalan, expressed 
the organizational motto as “ Let’s kill to be an authority”86 (see Figure 4). The 
PKK carried out numerous violent attacks on government and security officials 
and Kurdish villages. The anarchy caused thousands of people to migrate to the 
western cities of Turkey and European countries. Michael Radu states that the 
Turkish government supported immigration to defensible centers. This is 
because the mountaineous terrain was a serious handicap in protecting civilians 
from the terrorists’ raids, and the existence of civilians prevented successful 
military operations.87  Nevertheless, the PKK, as an opportunist group, turned 
the migration to its advantage by employing some of the desperate immigrants in 
its criminal activities.   
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Figure 4.  The PKK’s Attacks on Kurdish Villages 
 
Note: Infanticide has been a common practice of the PKK for terrorizing people. 
During the PKK’s years of violence, the majority of civilian victims has been 
ethnic Kurds. Source: Milliyet Newspaper Blog,  February 1, 2010, 
http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/kurt-isyanlarinin-nedenleri--tarihcesi-ve-pkk-katliamlari--
3-/Blog/?BlogNo=227075.   
 35 
2. Alliance with Kurdish Drug Lords 
Like many other terrorist organizations, the PKK started creating 
alternative revenue by entering the drug business. Although the Marxist ideology 
of the PKK rejects the rule of feudality and class exploitation, it developed strong 
relations with some Kurdish clans, “the Aksoy, Aydınlı, Baybaşin, Cantürk, 
Güven, Kıtay, Kocakaya, Koylan, Özdemir, Polat, Sakık, Toprak, Uğur, and 
Yıldırım.”88 Haut likens those relations to those of Sicilian Mafia families. He 
highlights that it is impossible to distinguish the PKK from these clans.89  
In the 1990s, the PKK and those clans, which had already captured the 
drug flow from the Golden Crescent to the Balkan countries, mutually benefited. 
Ekici et al. note that the relation began as the PKK started imposing “patriotic 
taxes” on Kurdish drug networks. Abdullah Öcalan, in his court, publicly 
sanctioned substantial contributions from the Baybaşin, Cihangir, and Cantürk 
families.90 During the alliance period, the PKK learned how to finance itself 
through the drug business, and Kurdish drug networks (clans) found the shelter 
that they were sseeking against the government. Kurdish drug lords secured 
themselves by tipping the PKK. They enjoyed the terror atmosphere, which the 
PKK created, because the state focused its attention on terrorism.   
3. Operational Tool Period 
After realizing that there is substantial revenue in the drug trade, the PKK 
initiated reorganizing its relations and structure. There are two major reasons for 
this change: first, for the greedy organization, tax income and extortion funds 
were tiny amounts when compared with the revenue of Kurdish drug lords. 
Second, for the drug lords, the PKK’s taxation diminished their competitiveness 
in the illicit market.   
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The PKK wanted to expand its financial capabilities by entering the drug 
arena. Makarenko notes that terrorist groups “copy their decentralized structure 
of cells and nodes from drug cartels” and the new cell-type structure gives them 
“a capacity to regenerate themselves” easily after severe law enforcement 
raids.91 Sanderson thinks that networked cell structure is highly resistant to 
intelligence efforts. They have minimal communication with the leadership, which 
authorizes them to make their decisions without approval.92 Ekici et al. argue that 
the PKK established semi-independent cells to have “in-house capabilities” to 
manage the drug business. By doing so, the PKK gained control of the drugs, 
from cultivation to street marketing.93  
On the other side, Kurdish drug lords were not content because the PKK 
over-exploited them. The terrorist organization not only imposed taxes on drugs 
at the Iraqi and Iranian borders, but also started extorting the Kurdish drug lords’ 
street sellers. Ekici et al. add that the dissatisfaction of the PKK created an 
organizational backlash against the Kurdish drug lords. In the mid-1990s, “the 
master-apprentice relationship was transformed initially into a roughly equal 
partnership.”94  
4. Commercial Terrorism Period 
In the early 2000s, the tension between the PKK and Kurdish drug 
networks increased. The PKK wanted to monopolize the European street market. 
Therefore, the spirit of the 1990s’ cooperation and partnership left its place to 
hostility. Ekici et al. provide a brief history of the rivalry between the groups in the 
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United Kingdom and the Netherlands.95 Both sides have and continue to recruit 
Kurdish immigrants who are living in European countries. Several street battles 
happened between the PKK and the Bombacılar (Bombers) group of Hüseyin 
Baybaşin, known as “Europe’s Pablo Escobar.”96 Consequently, the PKK 
militarily defeated its rivals in the drug trade and became the hegemon of the 
Balkan drug route.  
The contemporary financial sources of the PKK are explained in detail in 
the fourth chapter. The organization is present in many types of illicit trade. It 
applied its vast experience in drugs to other illicit areas, such as cigarette and 
arms smuggling, human trafficking, prostitution, extortion, and money laundering. 
Haut argues that the PKK was once a political organization, which later turned to 
crime. He notes that the organization “maintains its ideological trimmings for 
public consumption” and “always puts forward its ‘revolutionary’ nature as an 
absolutory excuse for all its crimes.”97 Some European communities employed 
pro-Kurdish rhetoric, just like the PKK, which indirectly supported the activities of 
the PKK in Europe. Some European countries were hesitant towards the PKK, 
which gave the organization the opportunity to strengthen itself and its links in 
Europe. Ekici et al. note that the PKK established nearly 300 cultural clubs and 
refugee camps in Europe. The PKK uses these points as its recruitment and drug 
distribution centers.98    
The personal motives of individuals are further evidence of the 
commercialism of the terrorist organization. Rosenthal notes that money is a 
strong motive for religion-affiliated terrorist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan. She 
shares the observations of the spokesperson in detainee operations, who said, 
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“Interestingly, we’ve found that the vast majority of the detainees are not inspired 
by jihad or hate for the coalition or Iraqi government—the vast majority are 
inspired by money.”99 She thinks that “in order to make a buck, these 
impoverished, unskilled, frustrated men were willing to do the bidding of 
jihadists.”100 At the foot soldiers’ level of the PKK, it can be claimed that 
ignorance and economic difficulties are not the sole reasons; however, they are a 
huge part of the problem of ongoing recruitment. Süleyman Özeren et al., from 
the International Center on Terrorism and Transnational Crime (UTSAM), 
estimates that 72 percent of PKK terrorists do not have an education or 
completed only elementary school, and 78 percent of them were unemployed 
before joining the organization.101 Their research indicates that some individuals 
see engagement as an occupation for themselves. The authors share 
testimonies from terrorists in prison. One says, “Our family was in financial 
trouble. One of my friends whom I met in that period told me that if I joined the 
organization I would no longer worry about money—I would be free from such 
concerns.”102 By joining the organization, the foot soldiers of the PKK gain a full-
time paid job. Therefore, the PKK members enjoy the revenue and benefits of 
this organization in accordance with their status in the group.  
5. Creating a Black Hole or Transforming into a Pure OC Group 
There seems two possibilities for the PKK’s evolution in the near future. 
First and worst, the PKK manages to create a black hole for itself. Rosenthal 
notes, “For-profit terrorists need to develop autonomous areas so they can 
cultivate more drugs or provide new smuggling routes, control more diamond 
mines, or rule over areas in which they can kidnap and hold hostages.”103 The 
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PKK has attempted several times to gain autonomy in the Eastern regions of 
Turkey. Nevertheless, the Turkish military and law enforcement units defeated 
them many times. Second, the PKK may transform itself into a pure organized 
crime group over time. In 2012, the Turkish government started talks with some 
cadres of the PKK. The ambition was to stop the clashes. In 2015, the 
government suspended the talks due to unexpected raids of the PKK merchants. 
It is obvious that there are different groups within the PKK: terrorists and 
merchants. Their opinions differ in accordance with their enjoyment level from the 
annual revenue of the PKK. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are differences and similarities between organized crime and 
terrorist groups. However, it is not easy to separate one from the other. In many 
cases, they are intermingled at various levels. Makarenko identifies the levels of 
connection and overlap between organized crime and terrorist groups. 
Among several terrorist groups, the PKK is a remarkable one because it 
acts as a commercial terrorism group. In reality, it lost its political objectives long 
ago; however, it still uses political sayings in order to convince individuals and 
leverage its position against the state. Today, the main goal of the hybrid 
organization is preserving its benefits against the international community and 
order. West Sands Advisory notes that ethno-nationalist groups that have used 
organized crime do not stop the violence even after they reach an agreement 
with the government. They state that the ETA and the PKK are examples of 
transforming hybrids, which use “the façade of political motivations to hide 
criminal activity.”104  
                                            
104 West Sands Advisory LLP, Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and 
Organised Crime Groups in the European Union (European Parliament, Brussels: Policy 
Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2012), 39. 
 40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
III. STATE SPONSORSHIP PERIOD OF THE PKK 
A. A PROXY FOR MANY COUNTRIES 
Michael Freeman outlines four ways to finance terrorism: “state 
sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular support.”105 State 
sponsorship is the initial funding method of many terrorist organizations. Faruk 
Ekmekci, an international relations professor at Karadeniz Technical University, 
notes that it may not happen at the birth of the organization; however, it carries 
organizations to other phases in which they thrive.106  This chapter reviews the 
state sponsorship phenomenon, using the PKK as a case study. It illuminates 
how some states exploited the Kurdish identity for their own goals and the 
various ways in which they supported the PKK.  
States can support terrorist groups to achieve their own goals. Martha 
Crenshaw, a political science professor at Stanford University, points out the 
frequency of state sponsorship, and she notes, “Supporting the opponents of 
one’s enemies is a common practice in international conflict, as is labeling the 
other side terrorist and one’s own side freedom fighter.”107 Daniel Byman groups 
the common reasons why states support terrorist groups in three categories: 
strategic, ideological, and political reasons. For strategic reasons, countries may 
want to weaken their rivals, to impose their wills on other countries, to change 
their administrations and establish sympathetic ones to themselves, and to help 
opposing groups. To achieve their ideological reasons, states can support 
terrorist groups to earn an international reputation for supporting oppressed 
people and to establish similar ideological regimes. States can also support 
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terrorism to pander to their own populations and also satisfy their economic and 
military requirements. Politicians may aid some ethnic and religious groups to 
acquire votes, or they can support terrorist groups to acquire more military aid or 
funds from the international community in order to use in their domestic 
conflicts.108 
State sponsorship may occur in various ways. Byman points out five 
different methods. First, it can train terrorists or organize joint operations with its 
intelligence members. Second, a state can donate money and supply weaponry 
and logistical support to a terrorist group.109 Third, terrorists specifically seek 
diplomatic support to justify their violent actions and, in return, they recruit more 
people and expand their influence on a larger population. Byman highlights this 
issue as he notes, “Terrorists crave recognition.”110 A sympathetic state can 
provide diplomatic support to the organization in international arena. Fourth, 
states can mentor terrorist groups in their organizational construction and 
ideologically lead them. Fifth, states can provide safe havens to terrorist groups 
to operate freely in their territories.111   
Freeman notes that the cooperation of sponsoring states and terrorists is 
a win-win game.112 Sponsoring terrorism is the securest and cheapest way for a 
state to wage war on the other as they did in past centuries.113 Ekmekci notes, 
“Terrorist organizations have been tools of the ‘powerful’ as much as terrorism 
has been the tool of the powerless.”114 Because states employ terrorist groups 
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as their “mercenaries.”115 By doing so, they can apply all violent methods without 
the restriction of international or ethical values. They can easily deny their 
responsibility, blame the terrorists, and protect themselves from judicial, 
economic, and military reactions.116 Also, using terrorists to achieve some of its 
goals is a state’s cheapest option. Freeman indicates that the estimated 100 
million USD per year that Iran is alleged of donating to Hezbollah is a tiny amount 
of Iran’s budget; however, it yields half of Hezbollah’s annual operational budget 
al.so, having a sponsoring state is the simplest funding method for a terrorist 
organization. The organization does not risk its members to earn money and it 
focuses on terrorist attacks.117 Bruce Hoffman notes,  
State sponsorship has in fact a “force multiplying” effect on ordinary 
terrorist groups. It places greater resources in the hands of 
terrorists, thereby enhancing planning, intelligence, logistical 
capabilities, training, finances, and sophistication. Moreover, since 
state-sponsored terrorists do not depend on the local population for 
support, they need not be concerned about alienating popular 
opinion or provoking a public backlash.118  
However, their collaboration may fall short of the terrorists’ expectations. 
First, states want priority for their own ambitions and they can easily abandon 
terrorist groups if they achieve diplomatic solutions to reach their ambitions.119 
Second, sponsoring states may break their ties with terrorists if they see a 
possible retaliation, military reaction, or damage to their state reputation in the 
international arena.120 At the same time, terrorist groups do not want to solely 
depend on state sponsorship because states try to limit the organization’s 
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activities or targets. States prioritize for their own objectives. Therefore, the 
terrorist groups attempt to improve self-funding techniques.121    
Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever, criminal justice scholars from Sam Houston 
State University, outline the state sponsors of the PKK as the Soviet Union, 
Greek Cypriots, Greece, Armenia, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Bulgaria, and Cuba.122 
Mincheva and Gurr note,  
Many of Turkey’s neighbors have supported the PKK at different 
points in time with money, weapons and training, safe haven, or 
with intangible moral and political support. State support for terrorist 
groups helps them survive and evolve into larger, better trained, 
and well-equipped groups. Some states, notably Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq, have provided substantial material support. Others, such as 
Greece and USSR, are also suspected of helping the PKK but 
supporting evidence is either anecdotal or controversial. And finally 
there are states such as Denmark and the Netherlands that have 
“passively” facilitated the PKK’s activities.”123 
It is difficult to review all of the PKK’s international relations. That would be 
a separate research project. However, Michael Radu, a political scientist and 
journalist, notes that Abdullah Ocalan’s political asylum seeking in 1998 and 
1999 revealed many facts about the PKK’s state sponsors.124 Therefore, this 
chapter specifically focuses on countries such as Syria, Greece, Russia, and 
Italy. Additionally, Armenia is studied to understand problem areas. This is 
because the bilateral relations between Turkey and Armenia are seasonally 
popular in the United States. 
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B. SYRIA 
Although Turkey and Syria share a 911-kilometer borderline and similar 
historical and religious backgrounds, Syria has consistently supported terrorist 
campaigns against Turkey. Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, political 
science professors at Middle East Technical University, note,  
Syria resorted to balancing acts against Turkey by providing 
sanctuary to the PKK, the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia), and the Turkish radical left (DEV-SOL). This 
support increased further after the 1980 military coup in Turkey, 
when many of these groups sought refuge abroad.125 
The U.S. Secretary of State designated Syria as a state sponsor of 
terrorism on December 29, 1979.  
Altunışık and Tür give four reasons for Syria’s PKK sponsoring activities. 
First, Syria was a part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of WWI. The Arabs 
supported the Allied forces in hopes of building their own nation state; however, 
their collaboration resulted in a French mandate. During its nation-building 
process, the Syrian authoritarian regime established its policies on enmities 
against Turkey and Israel. Second, the unification of Hatay and Turkey in 1939 
strengthened Syria’s hatred. Syria considered the unification illegitimate until the 
1970s. These two motivations explain Syria’s revengeful policy against Turkey. 
Third, Turkey started constructing a series of dams on the Euphrates for 
irrigational and energy purposes: Keban in 1974, Karakaya in 1987, and Ataturk 
in 1990. Syria protested the construction of the dams, which is known as the 
Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP), by supporting the terrorist 
organization, the PKK. Byman sees Syria’s support for the PKK as a “tool”126  to 
manipulate the water-sharing issue. Altunışık and Tür note that by a protocol 
signed in 1987, Turkey would give Syria 500 cubic meters of water per second, 
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and both parties agreed to mutually extradite terrorism suspects.127 However, the 
Syrian regime disobeyed the protocol by continuously supporting PKK 
terrorists.128   Fourth, Altunışık and Tür point out that Syria supported the PKK in 
order to “quell the possible aspirations of its own Kurdish population.”129 Radu 
notes that Syrian Kurds were the main recruitment source for the PKK. He 
argues that Ocalan ignored the suffering Kurds in Syria and collaborated with the 
brutal Hafez Assad regime.130 Assad encouraged the PKK to establish a Kurdish 
state wherever it wanted, but not in Syrian territory. Thanks to the PKK, he 
managed to direct Syria’s own Kurdish problem to another country.  
Abdullah Öcalan and PKK terrorists escaped to Syrian-controlled Lebanon 
in 1979. Mehmet Orhan, a political sociologist at the School for Advanced 
Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS in France), notes that, before the military 
coup in September 1980, the PKK terrorists communicated with Palestinian 
Marxist Organizations to provide shelter in the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon.131 Radu 
cites PKK sources that describe its escape as a ‘tactical retreat’132 to protect 
itself from the military coup and prosecution. He notes that they were given 
“relatively free rein in the Syrian-controlled Beka’a [Beqaa] Valley…where they 
thrived.”133 Providing a safe haven in Syria-controlled Lebanon was the 
beginning of the Syria and PKK relationship. During the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, Abdullah Ocalan moved to Damascus and started controlling the 
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organization from his villa.134 The organization held its so-called second 
congress in Damascus in 1982.135 Orhan argues that the vacuum after the Israeli 
invasion created an opportunity for the PKK terrorists to invade Palestinian 
camps in Beqaa Valley and capture their weapons. He adds that the PKK had 
terrorist camps in Barr Elias, Quab Elias, Riyak, Masnaa, and Baalbek in Syrian-
controlled Lebanon.136 As Andrew Mango notes, Ocalan accepted that 15,000 
recruits were trained in those camps by 1994.137 Those camps were employed 
not only for training, but also for drug production. Political science scholar Sedat 
Laciner argues that the PKK started its drug business by cultivating opium and 
hemp around its camps (Baalbek and Hermen) in Lebanon. Thanks to the 
support of the Syrian and Greek administrations, the terrorist organization 
acquired significant revenue from transporting drugs from the ports of Beirut, 
Sayda, Sur, Miryan, Abdeh, and Tripoli to the Greek Cypriot, Greek, and Italian 
ports.138 Mango highlights the Soviets’ involvement in arming Marxist groups in 
Turkey since the 1970s. The Soviets used Syria and Bulgaria as its proxies in the 
affairs with Marxist revolutionaries in Turkey.139 
Although the PKK trained its terrorists and carried out continuous raids in 
Turkey, the Syrian regime continuously denied Abdullah Öcalan’s presence in 
Syria and the terrorist camps in Syrian-controlled Lebanon. Turkey attempted, 
but often failed, to solve Syria’s PKK-sponsoring problem diplomatically. Altunışık 
and Tür cite an anecdote of Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, who was then 
the prime minister, which describes the indecent attitude of the Syrian regime: 
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in 1993 when I went to Damascus as a Prime Minister. I talked to 
Hafiz Assad for four and a half hours. I said, ‘This is not being 
neighborly. This man [Abdullah Ocalan] is killing my citizens, 
soldiers, teachers, imams. He is giving orders from here. This is 
against being Muslim, neighbors, and friends. Get this man out of 
here, give him to us.’ ‘No, he is not here,’ he said. In response I 
pulled out a paper from the file. The addresses the man resides, 
the telephone numbers he uses, they are all written. I gave it to 
him. I said, ‘Right now he is in Latakia at this number. If you call 
him now, you can find him.’ He took the paper, folded it unabashed, 
put it in his pocket. The idea that without cutting Syria’s support, 
this cannot be ended became clear to me that day at that moment. 
It has been reinforced in time.140  
Turkey tried several times to diplomatically encourage Syria not to 
sponsor the PKK’s activities; however, the Syrian regime continued its denial 
policy for years. Consequently, the Turkish government decided to force Syria to 
expel PKK terrorists. In his inaugural speech on October 1, 1998, President 
Demirel declared that Turkey could no longer be patient with Syria and it 
reserved its right to retaliate if Syria continued sponsoring the PKK. To show its 
determination, Turkey immediately strengthened its military presence at the 
Turkish–Syrian border.141 Egyptian President Husnu Mubarek initiated shuttle 
diplomacy between the two sides, and Syria responded to Turkey’s seriousness 
by expelling Öcalan out of Syria. Both sides met in Adana, a Turkish city close to 
the Turkish–Syrian border, and signed the Adana Accord on October 20, 1998. 
Altunışık and Tür state that the accord ended Syrian logistical support for the 
PKK, and Syria closed the PKK’s training camps.142  
Losing its safe haven in Syria was a breaking point for the PKK. It created 
a domino effect in the PKK’s international relations and policies. Mustafa Coşar 
Ünal, a Turkish Police superintendent and scholar, discusses these effects in his 
study for the PKK’s strategic periods. In 2000, the PKK gathered an extraordinary 
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congress, known as its seventh or “evolution/transformation congress.”143 The 
terrorist organization announced “the use of political effort rather than the use of 
violence as a sole means to reach its goal.”144  
The PKK aimed to change the international and public opinion about itself. 
To achieve that goal, it attempted twice to change its name, from the PKK to the 
Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in 2002, and then to the 
Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL) in 2003. Unal notes KADEK’s goal 
was “the recognition of Kurds in Turkey’s Constitution (including certain cultural 
and linguistic rights) as opposed to PKK’s initial goal of founding an independent 
Kurdish state comprised of territories from Syria, Iran, and Iraq.”145 In 2003, 
KONGRA-GEL, which was established to replace KADEK, stated that it was not 
going to employ violence to reach its goals.146 Later, KONGRA-GEL, which was 
unsuccessful in creating a new view among the public as a political organization, 
returned to its old name, the PKK. 
C. GREECE 
Mango believes that the trajectory, which Öcalan followed after his 
expulsion from Syria, is an important hint about the PKK’s international links and 
sponsors. First, he fled to the Greek Cypriot region, then to Greece. Until his 
capture, on the way to Nairobi Airport on February 15, 1999, he commuted 
between Greece, Italy, and Russia. When he was captured, he was going to the 
airport for a flight to Holland. He travelled all of those countries with a diplomatic 
Greek Cypriot passport issued under a false name147 (see Figure 5). Greece was 
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the first place he sought political asylum; however, Greece did not grant such a 
thing in order not to reveal its covert operations.148   
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Figure 5.  Abdullah Öcalan’ s Diplomatic Passport 
 
Source: “Abdullah Öcalan’ın Yakalanışı [The capture of Abdullah Öcalan],” 
Sabah, accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber 
/yasam/abdullah_ocalanin_yakalanisi?tc=34&page=5. 
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Radu points out the importance of Ocalan’s arrest, saying “Greece 
supported, tolerated, and encouraged the PKK for more than a decade, as the 
circumstances surrounding Öcalan’s arrest ultimately revealed.”149 On December 
23, 1998, a Greek daily newspaper called Eksusia interviewed Öcalan about the 
relationship between Greece and the PKK. He stated:  
…Greece has played a great part in my decision to go to Europe. 
Let me put it clearer: If there had not been my Greek friends, I 
would never have been able to come to Europe. If we did not have 
this friendship with Greece, I could not come  to Europe. My 
friendship with Greece encouraged me in making my decision to 
come to Europe. We opened a gateway in Europe (meaning his 
arrival in Italy). If we succeed going through this gateway, a political 
solution to the problem would then be found. This would be a 
political success for Greece…as well.150 
Greece’s sponsorship can be summarized in three main dimensions: 
providing shelter, training, and logistics. The PKK established a sub-organization 
to operate freely in Greece, which is called National Liberation Front of Kurdistan 
(ERNK). The ERNK opened offices freely in Greece: two ERNK offices, two 
Kurdistan Committees, a Kurdistan Cultural Center, a Kurdish Red Crescent 
Office, and a Kurdistan Solidarity Committee. The offices freely displayed PKK 
banners, and famous Greek politicians attended several opening ceremonies of 
those offices. The offices all worked for the propaganda and fund-raising 
operations of the terrorist organization.151 The Patterns of Global Terrorism 
Report of the U.S. Department of State notes,  
The Greek Government also continues to tolerate the official 
presence in Athens of two Turkish terrorist groups-the National 
Liberation Front of Kurdistan, which is the political wing of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Revolutionary People’s 
Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)-formerly Devrimci Sol-which is 
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responsible for the murder of two U.S. Government contractors in 
Turkey.152  
The PKK’s facilities were not limited to propaganda offices. The 
organization also had training and fund-raising camps and cells in Greece. The 
most famous camps were “Lavrion Refugee Camp” and “Lamia Halkida Camp.” 
The cells were in Aharnon, Dafni, and Thessaloniki.153 The testimonies of 
captured PKK terrorists show that they were trained in those camps in 50- to 70-
people groups for two- to three-month periods. They were trained to apply 
sabotage techniques and utilize explosives.154 Michael Gunter notes that some 
retired Greek high-ranking officers helped the PKK train its terrorists and planned 
sabotaging tourism in Turkey.155 
The statements of PKK terrorist Seydo Hazar, who was seeking shelter, 
appeared in The Observer on September 28, 1997. He claimed,  
When he lived in a PKK safe-house in the village of Drosia, he left 
behind a large cache of explosives, including TNT and Amonal, as 
well as the precursors for chemical and biological agents. These 
include the nerve agent sarin and laboratory facilities for producing 
the E.coli and botulism bacterias.”156  
Although The Observer informed Greek authorities about the places of the 
materials, they failed to find any evidence of or suspects in the targeted search 
following these statements. The Greek authorities announced that it was Turkish 
propaganda.157 Nevertheless, long before the statements of Saydo Hazar, Greek 
                                            
152 U.S. Department of State, 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, Europe and 
Eurasia Overview. http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/europe.html. 
153 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece and PKK Terrorism, 47. 
154 Ibid., 65–71. 
155 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 
1997), 110–111. 
156 Shyam Bhatia Naxos and Leonard Doyle, “Poison Bomber Offers Secrets for Sanctuary 
Fugitive Kurdish Terrorist Reveals: 1 Kurdish PKK Plan Sarin Attack on British Tourists: 2 Greeks 
Shelter PKK and Provide Stinger Missiles: 3 Terror Inc: Tamils PKK, Hamas and Neo-Nazis 
Collude,” The Observer, Sep 28, 1997, 1. 
157 Ibid., 1. 
 54 
journalist Panos Panagiotopoulos had an interview with Öcalan in Beqaa Valley. 
In the interview, broadcasted on Greek Sky TV on March 11, 1996, Öcalan 
warned European tourists not to go to Turkey and “if they do, the PKK cannot be 
held responsible.”158 The PKK was obviously planning urban attacks, particularly 
on tourist resorts.159 The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that Greece 
encouraged PKK terrorists to attack tourism in Turkey. Being located on two 
opposite sides of the Aegean Sea, Turkey and Greece were competing for the 
Mediterranean low- and middle-income tourism market. Greece wanted to 
canalize tourists to the Greek islands by blocking Turkey’s share of 
Mediterranean tourism. Haut cites Şemdin Sakık, who once acted as the second-
in-command, as he reiterates Öcalan’s view: “We will attack tourist sites, 
especially in the Mediterranean region in order to put an end to tourism in 
Turkey. Our target is not the tourists, but [to] destroy tourism and the flow of 
money in Turkey.”160 
The second point raised by Seydo Hazar was the PKK’s involvement in 
global arms trade with the help of Greek authorities. Hazar states,  
11 Stinger missiles, manufactured under license in Greece, were 
sold by his group to the Tamil Tigers and subsequently used to 
shoot down military transport planes over Sri Lanka. Two weeks 
ago a Sri Lankan air force plane was shot down by a missile 
believed to be a Stinger, killing 80 servicemen.161  
It is difficult to clarify the PKK’s role, whether it was a mediator between 
Greece and Tamil terrorists or it was a seller. It may have acquired revenue by 
selling arms, which were given by its own sponsor. Ekici et al. note the official 
testimony of Şemdin Sakık as he claims that the PKK bought 50 stinger missiles 
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from Greece.162 Gunter mentions a secret file, which was presented to Turkish 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller in 1993. In the file, it was claimed that Greece paid 
900 USD/monthly to the ERNK members, and it procured Aris antitank missiles, 
different kinds of arms, and explosives.163  
The organization sells publications in many countries to accomplish two 
goals: propagating and extorting money. Greece permitted the PKK to publish 
and sell its propaganda materials called Kurdish Report (English), Foni Tu 
Kurdistan [Kurdistan’s Voice] (Greek), Al Aouge (Arabic), and El Evch (Arabic). 
The Arabic materials were sold in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq164 (see Figure 6). 
Greece is located on a territory vulnerable to illegal immigration. The 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that Greece discriminated against 
illegal immigrants and asylum seekers because of their nationalities. It accepted 
ethnic Kurds on its own territory and later placed them in refugee camps to 
indoctrinate them against Turkey; however, it deported all others from Iraq, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.165 The selective attitude of Greece created 
another financial opportunity for the PKK terrorists. The Turkish document on 
Greece and PKK relations mentions a German ARD television program called 
Report. It was first broadcasted on January 18, 1998. The program interviewed a 
European gang member focused on human trafficking. He said,  
Our organization is not directly linked with the PKK, but on several 
occasions we had to pay ransom to the PKK in order to do our job. 
The PKK itself is also involved in human trafficking. In Greece there 
is no permission to the others. My organization can only smuggle 
people into Greece, but from Greece onwards, it is exclusively a 
PKK job.166  
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Greece denied its involvement in many phases of the PKK’s development, 
despite the evidence and testimonies of many PKK terrorists. However, the ways 
Greece physically and politically protected Öcalan undeniably exposed the links 
between the two. On November 26, 1998, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 
publicly stated that the PKK is an “organization fighting for the rights of the 
Kurdish minority and using various means to reach this end.”167 Another 
statement came from the Greek Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, George Nicolaidis, 
on December 8, 1998. He said, the “PKK is a political organization and also a 
military one. It fights for the liberation of Kurdistan. So, it is a liberation 
movement. It has a political office in Greece, which, you know, is a free 
country.”168  
After Öcalan’s expulsion, Greek authorities supported him not only with 
their political statements, but also with physical protection by Greek agents in 
safe houses. Although the Greek government was eager to provide political 
asylum to the terrorist, they tried not to show it openly. Therefore, they helped 
Öcalan in all means to find political asylum. Öcalan commuted between Athens, 
Moscow, Rome, and Nairobi.169 Before his capture on February 15, 1999, 
Öcalan lived in the Greek embassy building in Kenya for two weeks.170 After the 
international community discovered the details of Öcalan’s flee and capture, the 
Greek government lost its prestige in its international relations and domestic 
politics. Greece was about to be designated as an international terrorism 
sponsoring state by the United States.  
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Figure 6.  PKK Posters in Greek 
 
Note: A poster of the ERNK office in Athens that notes “more support for our 
common victory against the barbarism of Turkish State.” It also includes a Greek 
National Bank account number to collect donations. Source: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Greece and PKK Terrorism (Ankara: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1999), 18.  
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To minimize that stigma, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis stepped 
back and sacrificed three ministers of his cabinet, including foreign affairs, 
internal affairs, and public order.171 Mango notes Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 
assigned a new foreign minister, George Papandreu, to alter the spirit of relations 
with Turkey. Both sides agreed on a protocol to fight together against 
terrorism.172   
Gunter outlines the Greek reasons for supporting terrorist campaigns 
against Turkey. First, some Greek nationalists have had a Megali Idea project to 
establish a great Greece on the Turkish territory, since the conquest of Istanbul, 
in 1453.173 Greece attempted to realize the project after WWI; however, the 
campaign ended in frustration because of the Turkish Independence War. Vamik 
Volkan, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Virginia, notes that, after the 
Independence War in 1922, Turkey did not perceive the Megali Idea project as 
dangerous until the 1970s, when Greece wanted to annex Cyprus Island.174  
Second, Greece had claimed regions of the Aegean Sea and flight zone, which 
challenged international and bilateral agreements. Greece attempted to leverage 
its military position by arming the Aegean islands and invading some Turkish 
rocks in Aegean Sea.175 However, the broader international arena did not 
support these claims and actions. Although Greece and Turkey are both NATO 
members, Greece continued its leveraging operations by using proxies, such as 
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the ASALA and the PKK. Öcalan said, “We love the Greeks. We are together 
because of the common [Turkish] enemy.”176 
D. RUSSIA 
The Soviet Union was the main sponsor behind many Marxist-Leninist 
terrorist groups.177 During the Cold War, it supported terrorists in order to 
weaken its rivals and expand its ideology throughout a larger area. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia took its place as the biggest heir to that 
empire. Michael Gunter outlines the main problems between the two states: the 
historical enmity between them, their rivalry to influence the newly emerged 
Turkish states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Russia’s refusal to reduce 
its military forces due to the Conventional Forces Reduction Agreement.178  
The Turkish chief of staff released a report about the captured weapons 
from the PKK and their origins. According to the report, there were 11,297 
Kalashnikov rifles, 5,713 rifles of other types, 1,610 rocket launchers, 11,568 
land mines, 3,490 hand grenades, and 2,885 pistols. Although the PKK, or the 
manufacturer, had erased serial numbers and specific marks on many of them, 
research on the identifiable origin of the weapons shows that 39.8 percent of all 
of the weaponry was manufactured by Russia and former Soviet countries. The 
PKK acquired 60.6 percent of its land mines from Italy, so Italian manufacturing 
follows Russian manufacturing with a total of 32.8 percent.179 Mango notes that 
these numbers and percentages cannot prove the state sponsorship of any 
country because Öcalan stated in his trial, “the procurement of weapons was 
largely a commercial affair.”180 One can blame arms smugglers, who specifically 
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chose ex-Soviet weapons because of the corrupted Soviet officials; however, the 
numbers of the weapons and the approaches of two states, Russia and Italy, 
towards the PKK problem indicate that such a coincidence is difficult to believe. A 
Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency report indicates the governmental 
knowledge and approval of Russia, Greece, Armenia, and the Greek Cypriots in 
the PKK’s procurement from the international black market.181  
Gunter notes that the PKK organized conferences in Moscow in February, 
September, and October1994. In December, some PKK sympathizers and the 
president of the Russian Minorities, Li Olega, opened a 680-square-meter 
“Kurdish House” in Moscow. During those meetings, Öcalan’s posters and PKK 
banners were used for decoration.182  After a couple of talks between Turkish 
and Russian diplomats, the two sides signed a protocol in 1995 in Ankara to 
prevent terrorism. According to the protocol, “Russia would not allow the PKK or 
a Kurdish House to be set up in Moscow in return for its policies in Chechnya.”183 
The protocol did not work as it was expected, because the Russian Duma, the 
lower house of the Russian Parliament, permitted the so-called Kurdish 
Parliament in Exile (KPE) to have a third conference in Moscow between October 
30 and November 1, 1995. Boris Yeltsin’s government did not recognize the 
KPE; however, the Turkish government believed that the conference could not 
take place without the approval of the Russian government.184 The level of 
bilateral relations fluctuated until 1998.   
When Syria expelled Öcalan, he went to Greece, then to Russia. He 
sought political asylum. The Duma voted to ask the government to grant him 
political asylum. However, the government rejected the Duma’s request.185 
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Turkey wanted Russia to extradite Öcalan. However, the Russian government 
chose to find another shelter for him in Italy. Moscow sent Öcalan to Rome with a 
member of the Italian Communist Party.186  
E. ITALY 
Italian scholars, Roberto Aliboni and Daniela Pioppi, state that the so-
called Kurdish parliament in exile assembled with Italian parliamentarians in the 
Sala del Cenacolo building of the Italian Parliament between September 28–30, 
1998. That was a preliminary act for Öcalan’s planned arrival. The PKK 
sympathizers were convinced that political asylum was out of the question, and 
Italy would be the new base for the PKK’s new age.  
On November 12, 1998, Öcalan landed in Italy bearing a falsified passport 
and escorted by Italian parliamentarian Ramon Mantovani from Italy’s 
Communist Refoundation Party.187 Öcalan declared his true identity and 
requested political asylum. Italian police arrested him due to two outstanding 
warrants: one by the German government and one by the Turkish government, 
which dates back to September 21, 1981.188 Turkey wanted Italy to extradite 
Öcalan; however, Italy refused Turkey’s request because of its constitution that 
prohibits extraditions to a country practicing capital punishment.189 Mango notes 
that Turkey wanted the German government to pressure Italy to extradite the 
terrorist to Germany because of the German court’s warrant. But he adds that the 
“German government chose safety in inactivity and refused to give effect to the 
arrest warrant of its own court.”190 An Italian court released the terrorist, and he 
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rented a villa in Rome.191 Aliboni and Pioppi point out that the Italian government 
tried to get international support, which it received from European Union 
members. EU foreign ministers declared that the PKK was a terrorist 
organization, but also that Italy’s decision not to extradite Öcalan was fair.192 The 
attitude of the Italian government seems far from good faith between countries 
and forces the limits of international law. First, Italy agreed that the PKK is a 
terrorist organization; however, it released the group’s known leader, who 
entered Italy under a false name and had two warrants. Second, it allowed a 
terrorist to use its territory as a safe haven, and then let him to escape from the 
country. 
F. ARMENIA 
The PKK has also developed relations with the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization and Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). 
Mango notes that, in 1980, ASALA held a press conference in the South 
Lebanese town of Sidon and declared that it would cooperate with the PKK.193 
Nur Bilge Criss, an international relations professor at Bilkent University, points 
out the timing of ASALA’s stagnation and the PKK’s emergence. According to 
Criss, the PKK started its violence against Turkey as soon as ASALA ceased 
targeting Turkish diplomats abroad.194  
As a landlocked country between two Turkish countries, Armenia has 
used ethnic Kurds to reach its own objectives. When Armenia declared its 
independence from the Soviet Union on August 23,1991, it was enagged in war 
against Azerbaijan. It invaded Karabagh, an Azerbaijani territory, and attempted 
to use the Kurdish identity by establishing a puppet state called the “Lachin 
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Kurdish Republic.”195 The so-called Lachin Kurdish Republic disassembled two 
days after its announcement. Radu notes, “with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
newly independent Armenia also provided enough help, or tolerance, for the PKK 
to threaten northeastern Turkey.”196 Gunter states that Turkish authorities 
discovered at least six PKK camps in Armenia. In those camps, PKK terrorists 
were trained by Armenians and infiltrated Turkey through the Armenian-Turkish 
border. There were two camps close to the Gyumri [Leninakan] province, one 
camp in the Mazdaian town, two camps close to the Mislis town, and one camp 
in the Colga town.197   
Mango notes that, in 2002, KADEK opened a school to train its leading 
members; however, within the same month “KADEK representatives in Armenia 
had been dismissed for a failure to abide by the instructions of the Armenian 
government.”198 He claims that the terrorist organization bought weapons, 
explosives, and rockets from Armenia on several occasions.199    
G. CONCLUSION 
Turkey has been the victim of separatist violence since 1978. Many of its 
neighbors, some European countries, and some members of the old Warsaw 
Pact helped the PKK survive for years. All these countries supported the 
organization in various levels and aspects.  
Syria sheltered the PKK for 18 years to weaken its neighbor and oppress 
its own domestic problems.200 It also used the PKK as a “bargaining chip”201 to 
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leverage its position on the water-sharing issue. The PKK trained its terrorists in 
Syrian-controlled Lebanon, and Öcalan led the organization from his 
headquarters in Damascus. Syria, both diplomatically and logistically, supported 
the PKK.202  
Greece trained the PKK terrorists in camps in Syria and Greece. It wanted 
to balance its position against Turkey’s stronger economy and conventional 
military. The Greek government aimed to improve its international and domestic 
popularity by procuring weapons, providing refugees, and recognizing the PKK 
as a political body. 
During the Cold War, the USSR supported Marxist groups around the 
world to fight against NATO members. It encouraged its allies such as Syria, 
Armenia, Bulgaria, and Eastern European countries. In the post-Soviet era, 
Russia backed the PKK diplomatically by allowing them to organize conferences 
and congresses in Russia. It played the PKK card against Turkey to strengthen 
its links in Caucasus and Central Asian Turkish States.  
The Italian government was eager to provide political asylum to the leader 
of the terrorist organization. Mincheva and Gurr note, “Ocalan enjoyed warm 
hospitality…while in the country [he] had no problems maintaining 
communications with his fighters in the Middle East.”203 Italy not only ignored his 
two arrest warrants but also sheltered and finally allowed him to escape from its 
territory. The Italian approach to the PKK issue during Öcalan’s escape indicated 
that the high ratio of Italian weaponry in the PKK’s stocks was not a random 
event.  
Armenia has never missed any opportunity to harm Turkey. It allowed the 
PKK to open camps in Armenia and helped the organization procure weapons. 
Armenia encouraged the PKK to threaten the northeastern region of Turkey. 
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Radu points out that, although Armenia was eager to help more, it was afraid of 
Turkish retaliation204  (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Although there are other states that helped the PKK at different levels, this 
paper reviewed the state sponsorship of only five to show the range of 
sponsoring. State sponsors manipulated the Kurdish identity, just as the PKK did, 
to justify their sponsorship acts. They wanted to achieve their own ambitions and 
used the PKK terrorists as their mercenaries and bargaining chips. It is worthy to 
remind the reader that two countries among the five that were reviewed are 
NATO members like Turkey. 
Table 1.   State Motivations for Sponsoring PKK Terrorism 























Syria X      X  
Greece X    X  X  
Russia X X   X X   
Italy     X  X  
Armenia X      X  
Adapted from Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor 
Terrorism, 27–31, Table 2.   



















Syria X X X   X 
Greece X X X   X 
Russia  X X  X  
Italy  X X    
Armenia X X    X 
Adapted from Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor 
Terrorism, 55–58, Table 3.   
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IV. FINANCIAL SOURCES OF THE PKK 
A. INTRODUCTION   
The geographic location of Turkey has made it a historical trade route 
from the Far East to the West. Turkey is on the Anatolia peninsula, where three 
continents, Asia, Europe, and Africa, converge. It has eight neighboring 
countries: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, and Bulgaria. 
It has a coastline of 8,333 kilometers on two different seas, the Mediterranean 
and the Black Seas.  
The terrorist PKK is mostly active in the southeastern region of Turkey 
where three borders, those of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, meet. However, the 
merchant PKK is everywhere, from Iran to Norway. Jay S. Albanese, from 
Virginia Commonwealth University, highlights three points that increase 
organized crime occurrence: “opportunity factors, the criminal environment, and 
the skills or access required to carry out the criminal activity.”205 Geographic 
restrictions of the terrain, the weaknesses of central authority, traditional 
feudalism,  endless conflicts and wars in the region, a culture of impunity, and 
existence of Kurdish drug lords that were experienced in drug trade and 
smuggling gave the PKK the criminal opportunity it was seeking. The organized 
crime activities of the PKK emerged as a result of all these criminal opportunities 
and the unreliability of state sponsorship.   
This chapter focuses on the criminal enterprises of the PKK by exploring 
its role in the drug trade, a widely known practice of terrorist organizations; then 
extortion, human smuggling for several purposes, cigarette smuggling, and 
money laundering. The legal businesses and institutions of the PKK or PKK 
sympathizers are used as covers for their illegal activities and money laundering 
operations.  
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B. DRUGS 
After the collapse of Soviet Russia, regional state funding was no longer 
reliable for the PKK. The PKK turned to cultivating and trafficking drugs to 
generate revenue. According to a Turkish Police report, the PKK fulfills the 
primary role in all stages of the drug trade: The PKK currently organizes and 
controls the cultivation of cannabis in the eastern and southeastern regions of 
Turkey; collects commission, or taxes, from individual drug traffickers; 
coordinates drug trafficking and smuggling; distributes and sells drugs in the 
European retail market; and launders the money that comes from the drug 
trade.206 
The PKK denies any involvement in the drug trade because it does not 
want to lose political support from European societies. Özdemir and Pekgözlü 
observe that the political support coming from European countries on behalf of 
the Kurdish identity helped it found 392 social and political institutions in Europe. 
These institutions are good covers for its illegal activities in Europe.207 On April 
20, 2011, The United States identified 
KONGRA-GEL founders Cemil Bayik and Duran Kalkan and PKK 
leaders Remzi Kartal, Sabri Ok, and Adem Uzun as specially 
designated narcotics traffickers (SNDTs) pursuant to the Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. [The federal authorities have 
frozen their U.S. assets, and banned them] from conducting any 
financial or commercial transactions within [U.S.] jurisdictions.208  
Jane’s Terrorism Report quotes U.S. Under Secretary for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen. He states that the PKK mainly relies on 
drug trade and it has created “a pan-European network of smugglers and 
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clandestine infrastructure to produce, transport, and traffic opiates and 
cannabis.”209  Later, on February 1, 2012, The United States designated four 
individuals and three Romanian-based companies as SNDTs for drug trafficking 
on behalf of the PKK or KONGRA-GEL.210  However, statements from Rojhelat 
News, which is a pro-PKK agency, deny the relationship between the PKK and 
the drug trade. An example statement on April 25, 2011, noted: 
Outrageous and unproven accusations and threats of persecution 
have been directed against five Kurdish politicians by the United 
States Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC). The five Kurdish politicians are accused of being actively 
involved in drug trafficking being financed by the Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK). These outrageous, unproven accusations are just a 
new way of trying to criminalize well known Kurdish personalities 
and limiting their legitimate political activities. Even though these 
are allegations only, the U.S. acts as if they were all proven 
accusations and thus justify keeping the PKK on the U.S. terrorist 
list.211  
There are many other statements on PKK sympathizers’ Internet sites. 
They accuse the U.S. government and European governments of suppressing 
Kurdish people and acting in their own interests. 
1. The Balkan Route 
Depending on UN and IMF official documents, Hutchinson and O’Malley 
argue that the drug trade constitutes 2 percent of the global economy and 7 
percent of international trade.212 According to the United Nations in 2009, 
manufacturers produced 83 percent of the world’s opium/heroin in 
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Afghanistan.213 It is hard to give an exact number for the amount produced 
because the amount of opium cultivation depends on climate, possible diseases 
in plants, and law enforcement effectiveness. However, heroin manufacturing in 
Afghanistan in 2011 was estimated at 467 tons.214 In 2011, the United Nations 
reported that Afghan heroin is shipped in three main directions: the northern 
direction to Central Asia, which uses the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan border; the 
east border with Pakistan, which serves China and Far East markets; and the 
west route to the Balkans that uses the Iranian border.   The PKK is mostly active 
on the Balkan Route (see Figure 7). 
Figure 7.  Afghan Heroin Trafficking Routes and Volumes in 2009 
 
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2011 
(New York: United Nations, 2011), 71. 
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According to the UN, every year, 95 tons of heroin passes across the 
borders of Turkey and is carried to Bulgaria, Greece, and Ukraine.215 Again, it is 
not easy to give a current number for the volume of the drug trade because it 
changes from year to year depending on the production levels in Afghanistan and 
the success of law enforcement officials in transit countries. Turkey is not a 
serious heroin consumer, but a transit country on the way to Europe.  
The opium and heroin reaches Turkey through Iran and Iraq. The PKK 
and Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran collaborate on the Balkan Route. 
Although the PKK and PJAK look like different terrorist organizations, the 
difference remains only in location. Mincheva and Gurr qualify PJAK as “a 
splinter group”216 of the PKK. PJAK is a member of Koma Civaken Kurdistan 
(KCK) and is loyal to the terrorist leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. PJAK has 
the same political objectives and terrorism strategy as the PKK, but it is active in 
the north of Iran.217  
The PKK has long been sheltered in Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria; 
however, it is most active in Turkey. It uses the advantage of settling on the 
borders between these countries and Turkey. The length of borders and 
mountainous characteristics of the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey 
create vulnerabilities for law enforcement units to control the entire border. After 
passing the Turkish border, smugglers carry the drugs on three main directions 
through Turkey:  
• Hakkari/Van – southeastern cities – central Anatolian cities – 
Istanbul – Edirne to Bulgaria/Greece  
• Hakkari/Van – southeastern cities – southern/western Anatolian 
cities and onward to Greece/Cyprus by sea  
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• Hakkari/Van – southeastern cities – central Anatolian cities – 
northern Anatolian cities – Ukraine218 
Roth and Sever note that  
80 percent of the drugs produced in the Golden Crescent, which 
comprises the region of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, are 
trafficked to the European market through Turkey. Most sources 
assert that the PKK plays an important role in the transportation 
process via the Balkan route.219  
It is illogical to ignore other drug smugglers in the region; however, the 
PKK acts as a drug cartel. Thanks to PJAK in Iran and cultural institutions in 
European countries, the PKK stretches its arms from Afghanistan to the end of 
continental Europe. With all these collaborators, the PKK is in the center of two 
different drug zones: Afghanistan, the world supplier with the lowest price; and 
European countries, the zone of highest demand with the highest price. Roth and 
Sever also quote the German chief prosecutor as he asserted that “80 percent of 
the drugs captured in Europe have been linked to the PKK.”220 
2. Revenue in the Drug Trade 
The shipping risks of opium/heroin create huge differences in values. The 
average opium price in Afghanistan in 2010 was 150 USD per kilogram; 
however, the average retail price per kilo of heroin in 17 countries located in 
Western and Central Europe was 70,000 USD the same year221 (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.  Opium Prices and Opium Production in Afghanistan 
Compared with Retail Prices of Heroin in Western and Central 
Europe, 1998–2011 
 
Source:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2012 
(New York: United Nations, 2012), 33. 
There are contradicting estimates about the PKK’s annual revenue from 
the drug trade. In 2008, General Ergin Saygun, who was then the deputy chief of 
the Turkish General Staff, made statements about the revenue of the PKK. He 
said that the PKK earns at least 200–250 million Euros from the drug trade. In 
her comparative study on FARC and the PKK, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, a professor 
of comparative politics at Siena College in New York, does not find Saygun’s 
2008 estimate for the PKK’s revenue credible. She believes that the Turkish 
General Staff exaggerates the annual amount to convince authorities to spare 
more resources for the country’s anti-terrorism program.222 In contrast to 
Eccarius-Kelly’s optimism, Emmanouela Mylonaki from London South Bank 
University notes that “the PKK has been reported to obtain 450 million Swiss 
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Francs each year through the selling of drugs in Europe, according to officials of 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.”223 This amount costs approximately 
470 million USD.  
Consequently, there is no consensus about the revenue from the PKK’s 
drug trade. Nevertheless, the UN affirms that the annual market value of the 
Balkan route is at least 20 billion USD.224 Curtis and Karacan cite the German 
chief prosecutor as he claims that 80 percent of the drug trade in Europe is in 
control of the PKK.225 Therefore, the estimation for the PKK’s annual income 
from drug trade as 250 million Euros is modest. A Jane’s Terrorism report noted 
“annual revenues raised by the group through drugs smuggling across Europe … 
amounted to 1 billion EUR (USD 1.43 billion).”226  
In 2013, Kashif Khan and Olcay Er conducted their Naval Postgraduate 
School master’s thesis on the revenues of the Taliban and the PKK. The PKK 
study considers only the opium/heroin trade of the Balkan route without 
calculating the cannabis cultivation/selling revenue. They separate the PKK’s and 
the Taliban’s heroin revenues in four segments: cultivation, manufacturing, 
shipment, and sale. According to their calculations, the PKK obtains 25 million 
USD manufacturing heroin, 325 million USD shipping, and 300 million USD 
selling it in the retail market. The total annual revenue reaches 650 million USD. 
The Taliban is the world’s supplier of opium/heroin; however, it earns between 
                                            
223 Emmanouela Mylonaki, “The Manipulation of Organised Crime by Terrorists: Legal and 
Factual Perspectives,” International Criminal Law Review 2, no. 3 (07, 2002), 231. 
224 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Drug Trafficking: Introduction,” accessed 
October 16, 2015, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking.  
225 Glenn E. Curtis and Tara Karacan, The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, 
Weapons Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe (Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 2002), 20. 
226 IHS Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),” 30. 
 75 
530 and 570 million USD. When compared with the Taliban’s annual revenue as 
the world supplier, the PKK as a trader earns more than the Taliban.227  
3. Cultivation and Manufacturing 
The PKK’s cultivation of drugs can be chronologically separated into three 
stages: opium cultivation in Syria in the 1980s, the failed attempt in the early 
1990s to cultivate opium in northern Iraq, and the establishment of heroin 
laboratories and hemp cultivation in Turkey throughout the 1990s. According to 
Sedat Laçiner, after the PKK established its initial organization in Syria, it took 
little time to discover the potential revenue from drugs, so the PKK started 
cultivating hemp and opium around its camps in Beqaa Valley, Syrian-controlled-
Lebanon. By respectively using Lebanese, Greek Cypriote, Greek, and Italian 
ports to transfer its products, the PKK earned a great amount of money in the 
1980s.228  
a. Heroin 
Khan and Er note that in the early 1990s, the PKK settled in ungoverned 
regions of northern Iraq and tried to cultivate opium; however, the climate did not 
allow it to fulfill this aim.229 They found transferring opium from Afghanistan to 
European Countries easier and more profitable.  
On the Balkan route, smugglers deliver much of the opium in heroin form 
and ready to use; however, the PKK also realized the marginal profit in the 
manufacturing process, so it established several heroin laboratories to process 
the morphine base with acetic anhydrite. Ekici et al. note that the PKK procured 
acetic anhydrite from Russia and Eastern Europe and the morphine base from 
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Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and Iran with the help of its organizational cells 
there.230 The PKK established several drug labs in Iran. Ekici et al. share the 
testimony of an Iranian drug criminal as he states:  
The PKK has established several drug labs in Urumiye-Aliabat 
District of Iran under the control of Osman Ocalan [Abdullah 
Öcalan’s brother]. The chemists receive $40,000-50,000 Toman 
per kg for producing heroin. After the production, the heroin is 
transferred to the Banya village (Iran) to be transferred to 
Yuksekova (Turkey) under the control of Osman Ocalan’s 
militants.231  
Özdemir and Pekgözlü explain that the PKK produce heroin in the eastern 
and southeastern regions of Turkey in “mobile laboratories.”232 Laçiner adds that 
the PKK also runs drug laboratories in eastern European countries.233  
The items captured in police operations give several details about the 
level of the PKK’s involvement in the drug business. The annual police report in 
2013 gave the result of 377 operations against the PKK carried out between 
1984 and 2013. Turkish law enforcement officials arrested 1,232 suspects and 
captured 4,584 kilograms of heroin, 36,550 kilograms of marijuana, 17,958,469 
roots of cannabis plants, 4,305 kilograms of morphine base, 22 kilograms of 
opium, 710 kilograms of cocaine, 344,135 pills of synthetic drugs, 27,630 liters of 
acetic anhydrite, and 4 laboratories to produce heroin.234 The materials captured 
reveal that the organization is active in cultivation, production, and shipping of 
drugs. 
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b. Amphetamine-Type Stimulants 
Although historically, Turkey has not been a serious drug consumer, its 
drug use has dramatically increased in the last decade. Ekici et al. point out that 
there are changes in the drug market as European addicts demand more 
stimulants, like cocaine and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATSs), than 
depressants.235 The source of the ATSs are mostly European countries and 
Russia; as a result, the PKK is not perceived as an ATS manufacturer. The PKK 
has benefited from the ATS market by bartering its heroin for ATSs. Ekici et al. 
note that the Turkish Police have captured thousands of ATS tablets during 
operations against the PKK. The organization is actively involved in the trafficking 
and marketing phases of ATSs. The authors add the statements of an unnamed 
drug investigator. He states that “we also observe that the criminal networks are 
bartering the heroin with synthetics in Turkey. They are bringing heroin from the 
east and bringing the amphetamines from the west. Then they exchange the 
substances in various destinations in Turkey.”236  
c. Cannabis 
In recent years, the PKK has concentrated on cultivating cannabis in the 
southeastern region of Turkey. It encourages the local sympathizers to cultivate 
cannabis, especially on public land or deserted areas. The law enforcement units 
can neither find nor convict anyone in many cannabis cultivation cases for two 
reasons. First, the Treasury of the Turkish Republic owns all the public lands. In 
many cases, the cannabis cultivated field does not belong to a private owner or 
the owner has not been living there for years. Second, the PKK frightens and 
threatens inhabitants who are not eager to collaborate with them. Threatening 
with violence prevents the local population from reporting it to the police. Ekici et 
al. note the testimonies of criminals who are convicted of cannabis cultivation. 
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One of them says, “the PKK was forcing us to plant cannabis in rural areas of 
Diyarbakır. I’m rendering much of the money to the PKK operatives. They come 
and supervise the harvesting process. It is almost impossible to divert some of 
the crops.”237  
In the 2000s, the PKK announced that it banned cutting wood in forests 
and it would punish anyone severely who cut trees.238 It claims that it does this 
for environmentalist reasons. However, the real goal behind that so-called 
environmentalist approach is mitigating the effectiveness of air reconnaissance 
for cannabis fields. In the Struggle against Smuggling and Organized Crime 2013 
Report, the Turkish Ministry of Interior specifically focuses on seven operations 
carried out in the rural Van, Hakkari, and Diyarbakır provinces in 2013. The law 
enforcement forces captured in total 18 suspects, lots of explosive ammunition, 
201 kilograms of heroin, 1,440 liters of acid anhydride, two laboratories, 3,260 
kilograms of marijuana, and 11,985,725 roots of cannabis plants.239 The abrupt 
increase in the production of cannabis and marijuana, when compared with the 
captured amount between 1984 and 2012, shows the new trend of the PKK in 
cultivation. 
The PKK invented new tactics during the negotiation period between 2013 
and 2015. West Sands Advisory notes, “the PKK uses Colombian methods— 
laying mines and hand-made explosives on roads to produce ‘liberated crime 
zones’—to protect drug fields. These methods may suggest that the PKK is 
simply learning the ‘tricks of [the] trade.’”240 The law enforcement units carried 
out several attacks against the cannabis fields in Diyarbakir. To interrupt these 
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attacks until the end of harvest, the PKK employed YDG-H, its sub-organization, 
to dig trenches on roads to prevent law enforcement vehicles and force people to 
act as human shields.241 The PKK used improvised explosive devices and mines 
against tactical vehicles that succeeded in passing over the trenches.  
While the PKK is running its drug business in the internal market, it 
collaborates with local inhabitants. These inhabitants are generally ethnic 
Kurdish people. Like the FARC, the PKK motivates the local population either by 
money or life threats. Rosenthal notes that in the territories in which for-profit 
terrorists settle, the population has been humiliated by years of violence. It is 
easier for the people to cooperate than stand against them. Also, the businesses 
and the PKK offers yield much more money than rural farming.242  
Feudality is still active in some parts of southeastern Turkey through social 
tradition. As noted in the second chapter, there are strong ties between some 
Kurdish clans and the PKK. Roth and Sever quote a Turkish security officer as 
saying, “the cooperation between the PKK and Kurdish criminal clans has been 
similar to the cooperation among Sicilian mafia families.”243 Jane’s Terrorism 
report mentions an investigation carried out by Turkish authorities in November 
2011 that shows the links of the PKK with home-grown criminal organizations: 
“According to the authorities, there were as many as 350 ‘criminal families’, 
predominantly based on ethnic Kurdish clans, actively involved in the production 
and sale of narcotics.”244  
It is hard to predict the annual income the PKK receives from heroin 
manufacturing and cannabis cultivation. However, research by Khan and Er 
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indicates that the PKK generates annually at least 25 million USD from heroin 
production—without considering the revenue of cannabis cultivation.245 
4. Collecting Commission 
After realizing the traffic from Afghanistan to Europe, the biggest share in 
the PKK’s revenue became the commissions it received from the drug 
smugglers. The PKK calls this commission money ‘tax.’ In a seminar by Turkish 
Police in 2011, Superintendent Dr. Mahmut Cengiz stated that there have been 
14 so-called custom points on the Iranian and Iraqi sides of the border run by the 
PKK.246 According to Turkish Police reports, captured terrorists and drug 
smugglers confessed that the PKK was getting commission per kilogram of 
heroin in the so-called custom points that it established on the border areas 
between Iran and Turkey. They stated that the PKK discriminates the drug 
smugglers according to the smugglers’ sympathy level to the organization. To 
allow passage, the PKK terrorists have behaved fine for PKK sympathizers and 
created several problems for the other smugglers who have not been in favor of 
the PKK. Between 1980 and 1990, the PKK was getting 1,000 Deutsche Marks 
or 10 percent of the whole price for commission; however, in the 2000s they 
started taking 50 dollars per kilogram or 10 percent of the price. The captured 
drug smugglers have all stated that without giving commission to the PKK, it has 
been impossible to pass from the mountainous terrain between Turkey, Iran, and 
Iraq.247  
Özdemir and Peksoylu share the confession of a lifelong PKK terrorist on 
the PKK’s so-called customary regulations. The ex-terrorist states:  
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There are four to six terrorists at each custom checkpoint. At the 
big custom checkpoints, there is a team consisting of 12 people. 
The amount of custom regulation money varies based on value of 
materials. Much money is collected for narcotics and wine whereas 
less money is collected for oil and sugar.248  
This testimony gives details about the daily practices of the PKK. They 
employ more people on high volume tracks in the mountainous terrain and 
consider the amount of commission depending on the material smuggled. The 
PKK leadership does not deny getting commission from drug smugglers. Roth 
and Sever cite Abdullah Öcalan’s testimony. After he was captured in 1999, he 
answered the judges’ questions about the PKK’s role in the drug trade:  
Osman Ocalan (his brother) is collecting money from people who 
conduct drug trafficking. In addition, there are some structures 
called customs units of the organization and located along the 
borders. They collect the money as well…On the borders a certain 
amount of money is collected from traffickers as a tax. Apart from 
that, I did not accept the proposal of drug trafficking in Iran/Maku 
region, although I knew it would provide a high level of income. 
Despite this fact, I learned that some people in the organization, in 
particular my brother, Osman Ocalan, were trafficking drugs to 
Europe through Iran, Zagros, and Romania.249 
The PKK is a rapidly learning and self-modifying organization; the volume 
of drug traffic stimulated its desire to establish its own courier network for 
transporting drugs to the European market. Due to PKK terrorism in 1990s, many 
ethnic Kurdish people from southeastern and eastern Turkey migrated to 
different cities in Turkey and European countries. However, they faced several 
financial and sociological problems at the destinations they reached. The PKK 
helped its sympathizers by recruiting them in the lucrative drug business, so the 
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dispersion of Kurdish people from Turkey to Europe strengthened the drug 
shipping and selling network of the PKK.250  
In 1998, Turkish forces seized the PKK’s second-man, Şemdin Sakık. In 
the interview by the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament, Sakık 
frankly iterated “the source of our money was drug trafficking. The PKK and Apo 
[Öcalan] have always gotten a big share from the drug trafficking on the drug 
route of Turkey-Middle East. We used money generated from drugs to purchase 
weapons.”251 Sakık’s confession proves that the PKK has become the main 
carrier on the Balkan route, but it is also interesting to see that Sakık 
differentiates the drug trade beneficiaries in two: the PKK and Apo. The PKK 
uses the money for buying ammunitions and weapons for further terrorist attacks 
and Öcalan most probably collects the money for his own wealth. After delivering 
drugs to the European market, the PKK uses its European links to distribute the 
drugs in the street market, which is as lucrative as the shipping process. Based 
on wholesale drug prices in Norway, the study of Khan and Er estimates that the 
shipping revenue of the PKK is annually at least 325 million USD; however, the 
PKK also receives 300 million USD by selling the drugs in retail.252  
5. European Street Market 
The PKK’s European collaborators are composed of Kurdish immigrant 
families and Kurdish cultural, humanitarian, and social foundations. Özdemir and 
Pekgözlü clarify the organizational structure in shipping and marketing by noting 
that:  
The PKK terrorist organization adopted the South American 
terrorist organizations’ model that establishes a fake firm and hires 
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personnel to conduct its drug delivery activities. In parallel with the 
South American model, the PKK abuses political and cultural 
foundations as main bases for the drug delivery network.253  
Due to the “one’s terrorist is anothers’ freedom fighter” mentality, it is hard 
to define terrorism in the international arena. Countries mostly act according to 
their own interests. Eccarius-Kelly notes the statement of Germany’s former 
federal state prosecutor Kay Nehm. He argues that the PKK behaved like a 
criminal rather than a terrorist organization.254 The cultural foundations cover its 
illegal activities by caching drugs, sheltering criminals, helping as a meeting 
point, and money laundering. 
In his article on the PKK’s drug smuggling activities, Laçiner notes that in 
European capitals, Kurdish children between the ages of 10–15 years old work 
as street sellers in entertainment centers and schools. The PKK has helped 
many Kurds to migrate illegally to Europe, and these people are forced to pay 
monthly protection money from their income.255 The PKK also earns huge money 
from human trafficking. However, people who cannot afford the trafficking price 
or the monthly protection money surrender mostly their children to be employed 
by the PKK in selling drugs on the streets. Roth and Sever observe some points 
on the PKK’s young collaborators in the retail drug selling business:  
PKK often use non-deciphered PKK immigrants such as children, 
juveniles, peasants, and workers in the European drug trade. A 
number of 1993 reports in Germany linked Kurdish children 
between 10 and 14 years old to drug activity. All confessed that 
they had been forced to sell drugs by the PKK because they did not 
have penal responsibility…In 1993 a Hamburg television station 
reported that local police arrested a Kurdish drug smuggling gang, 
which included an 11-year-old child. He confessed that the PKK 
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smuggled him into Germany with others and forced them to sell 
drugs for terrorist organization.256  
The PKK is involved in many phases of the drug trade. Although it publicly 
denies any involvement in the drug business, evidence shows us that it is a drug 
cartel on the Balkan route between Afghanistan and Europe. It earns money in 
many different ways. Establishing several so-called customs in Iran and Iraq, the 
PKK receives commission from individual drug smugglers who deliver from 
Afghanistan to Turkey. It has since established its own courier network to ship 
drugs from Afghanistan to European countries. Even though it seems a separate 
terrorist organization, PJAK collaborates with the PKK in Iran. It controls drug 
trafficking in Iran and delivers drugs to the PKK on the Turkish border.  
The PKK is an umbrella organization that shelters many criminal families, 
many sympathizers, and many institutions in Europe. The PKK works together 
with criminal families in order to cultivate cannabis and manufacture heroin in 
laboratories. The mountainous character and the length of Iranian, Iraqi, and 
Syrian borders challenge police forces to work effectively in the terrain. The PKK 
carries the drugs to European markets for the best possible price. It uses its 
European links such as cultural, humanitarian, or social institutions to disguise its 
illegal activities in Europe. In Europe, PKK sympathizers and asylum seekers 
who have migrated are generally employed on the streets to sell drugs on behalf 
of the PKK. Many of the people detained for drug sales are children who say that 
they have been forced by the PKK to do so.  
C. EXTORTION 
The PKK extorts money from people in many places, under different 
names for each activity. The extorted people are mostly Kurds who live in 
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The PKK has different names for its extortion 
money: customs, taxes, commissions, membership fees, protection fees, and 
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revolutionary taxes. The name changes depending on the type of targeted 
individuals. The PKK has a dual goal in their extortion crimes as many other 
terrorist organizations around the world do. 
Freeman notes the two goals of extortion. First, extortion is a good 
financial source for terrorist groups because they can collect it as frequently as 
they need. The amount of the revenue increases as they brutalize or frighten 
people. Second, the people who are forced to give money cannot report this 
event to police forces in most cases because of death threats from these groups. 
Neither able to control its territory nor protect its citizens against terrorists, the 
state authority loses the public’s confidence, thus increasing the popularity of 
illegal groups. Freeman calls this effect “passive support.” Once they get the 
passive support of the public, they can conduct their terrorist operations more 
comfortably. Terrorists are not afraid that the public will report them because they 
think that the extorted people give consent by sponsoring them. The terrorists 
find extortion a vital process for legitimizing their activities and including the 
public in their criminal network. If the terrorists are captured as a result of being 
reported, they can also report people to police forces for sponsoring their 
operations; therefore, the extortion incriminates the extorted people.257 
At its so-called third congress in 1986, the PKK declared the Act of 
Taxation. With this act, PKK terrorists began disguising their racketeering by 
providing receipts.258 This also served as a political trick to show itself as a 
governmental body. There are three targeted groups for the PKK’s extortion 
crimes: the aforementioned smugglers who provide custom taxes or commission; 
Kurdish-origin people in Turkey, especially businessmen and artists; and Kurds 
living abroad (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9.  Extortion Letter 
 
Note: In the letter, the PKK regional leader is demanding 7,000 USD from a 
businessman in Istanbul. These letters are followed either by a receipt or another 
threat letter. Source: Habip Ozdemir and Ilker Pekgozlu, “Where Do Terrorist 
Organizations Get Their Money? A Case Study: Financial Resources of the 
PKK,” International Journal of Security and Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2012): 99.  
The PKK extorts money from the people in the eastern and southeastern 
regions of Turkey. The PKK has built its popularity on brutal operations targeting 
local people since 1984. People that do not want to pay face physical harm or 
death. Jane’s Terrorism Report highlights the most targeted group as 
businessmen. Businessmen who submit state bids in the eastern and 
southeastern regions of Turkey are often forced to pay the PKK 10 or 20 percent 
of their income. The report affirms that the total annual worth of state bids 
awarded in these regions is at least 800 million USD.259 Freeman points out the 
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parasitic relationship between the terrorists and their extortion sources. The 
parasite does not want to harm its host because harm against the host may also 
kill the parasite. Thus, the PKK does not intend to kill the businessman who 
refuses to pay.260 Consequently, it harms the businessman by burning or 
vandalizing his property, like heavy construction equipment. As a second phase, 
the PKK threatens, kidnaps, or murders the workforce hired by the businessman. 
In doing so, it forces the businessman to cooperate with the group. If the 
businessman still does not surrender to the PKK’s demands, the group punishes 
him with death.261 
The PKK forces people living abroad to contribute money in the name of 
revolution, protection, or membership. Özdemir and Pekgözlü name the countries 
from which most of the abroad extortion is collected: Germany, Romania, Russia, 
Holland, Denmark, France, Italy, Switzerland, England, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. 
The authors also share the testimony of Abdullah Öcalan, who admits “the 
money collected in Europe is sent to members in Iran and Iraq by couriers. In 
European countries, annually, 30 million German Mark[s] … [are] collected as 
fees.”262 The PKK claims that these are voluntary contributions to the 
organization; however, the truth is not what the PKK reflects. Roth and Sever 
mention that the PKK gets “insurance fees’” in Green Lanes in Northern London. 
The restaurants that do not pay the insurance fee face retaliation. They also 
highlight that in 1993, the PKK acquired 2.5 million pounds from Kurdish people 
in Great Britain.263   
There are also other methods of how it forces people to donate. The 
sympathizers sell newspapers, propaganda books, and tickets for cultural events. 
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Özdemir and Pekgözlü observe that a Kurdish publication, called Serxwebun, 
does not have a fıxed price. This is because the price of the publication depends 
on the client’s income level.264 Also, Ruehsen shares the confessions of former 
PKK members involved in extortion in Europe. They explain the details about 
forcing people to subscribe to certain magazines for small donations and a big 
contribution every year. The terrorists tell people to work 12 months for 
themselves and a month for the struggle. In their confessions, they admit “when 
that did not work…the money was coerced.”265 
It is thought that the extortions form one third of the PKK’s annual 
budget.266 An operation in 1996 revealed many documents about the PKK’s 
extortion crimes. The Scotland Yard and the Belgium Police carried out an 
operation against Med TV Broadcasting Company. In the research, police forces 
found lists of people in Belgium and Germany who were extorted continuously. 
The lists also documented that the PKK was acquiring 300,000 francs per month 
only in Belgium.267 Jane’s Terrorism Report points out “the PKK was alleged to 
have stored in excess of 1 billion USD raised through extortion activities in 
foreign bank accounts.”268 Özdemir and Pekgözlü contribute that the PKK 
decreased its violence against Kurdish people in the last years as a 
consequence of losing political support and being designated as a terrorist 
organization by the EU and the United States.269 
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D. HUMAN SMUGGLING 
The peninsular characteristic of Turkey creates numerous routes for the 
PKK’s human smuggling operations, but weaknesses for law enforcement units. 
In a single operation, Italian security officials discovered that the PKK had 
smuggled 9,000 people from Turkey to Europe in 2001. Turkey to Greece or Italy 
is the most popular route; however, the PKK also uses the route from Turkey to 
Romania for transportation.270 Once the immigrants land in Europe, local 
collaborators lead them through European countries. The PKK benefits from 
human smuggling in three ways. First, it receives a revenue from the human 
smuggling process. Second, it recruits most immigrants as collaborators in its 
European organization. Third, it traffics eastern European women to western 
Europe to exploit them in its prostitution rings.  
Özdemir and Pekgözlü explain the process of human smuggling in detail. 
First, the PKK gathers passports, ID cards and visas from its collaborators in 
Turkey. Next, it carefully selects people among its sympathizers who do not have 
criminal records. The PKK counterfeits original documents and distributes the 
fake ones to illegal immigrants. These illegal immigrants use fake documents at 
their final destinations. The PKK then transports illegal immigrants via various 
routes.  
There are contradicting numbers about the PKK’s price per person in 
human smuggling. Roth and Sever quote Interpol as it estimates the 
transportation fee at 2,000 to 3,000 Euros per person. However, the Romanian 
police discovered many immigrants with forged documents by the PKK, and the 
immigrants reported that they paid 6,000 to 7,000 Euros to reach European 
capitals.271 The PKK may be diversifying the price according to the nationality of 
the immigrants, the route they choose—transportation to a Schengen zone 
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country like Italy, Greece, or Romania costing more—and the amount of service 
they require, like counterfeited documents and transportation or only 
transportation. 
Interpol defines human smuggling as a gain-based trade because when 
the illegal migrant reaches the arranged destination, the relationship between the 
smuggler and the immigrant normally ends; however, the PKK keeps the relation 
to recruit more people to increase its influence in Europe. The PKK’s European 
links guide the immigrants and provide them initial shelter in Europe. The PKK 
utilizes its social and cultural foundations as bases in Europe. In 2004, an illegal 
immigrant was caught at the Bucharest Kurd Cultural Foundation in Romania.272 
Roth and Sever point out another extortion method of the PKK, which occurs 
after the immigrants reach their destinations. The illegal immigrants pay a 
“membership fee” to the PKK’s “front organizations” to provide them shelter, 
food, and jobs.273 By creating financial and cultural ties, the PKK does not let its 
former clients leave its control. Being illegal is the immigrants’ vulnerable point. 
At any time, the PKK can anonymously report the immigrants to the local police 
to be deported if they do not collaborate with the PKK. The PKK further 
incriminates the illegal immigrants and recruits them in its European criminal 
operations, using their anxiety over their illegal status.  
Trafficking women for prostitution is another source for many human 
smuggling groups. Rey Koslowski, a professor from the University at Albany, 
notes the victims are mostly Russian and eastern European women. Human 
traffickers convince them to employ them as nannies, hostesses, or dancers; 
however, the traffickers take the passports of the women so they can no longer 
escape. In order to pay their smuggling debt, the traffickers force them into 
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prostitution, but the debt never ends.274  Soner Çağaptay, director of the Turkish 
Research Program at the Washington Institute, argues that the PKK is 
“smuggling illegal immigrants into the EU, and running prostitution rings to raise 
funds.”275 Amy O’Neill, a researcher for the U.S. Department of State, supports 
his claim with a statement of a Belgian Interpol officer. The Belgian official states, 
“[the] PKK has used traditional alien smuggling routes to traffic women to 
Belgium for prostitution.”276 Belgian Parliamentarian Patsy Sörensen, who had 
written the Women Trade Report for the European Parliament, highlights that the 
PKK is the boss of most brothels in Germany and Holland. She adds that the 
organization has trafficked women from Albany and Russia. It has forced them 
into prostitution by threatening them with their lives. She states that women trade 
is the least risky business for a terrorist organization because women trade crime 
does not have serious punishments in Europe.277  
E. CIGARETTE SMUGGLING 
The PKK is involved in cigarette smuggling between Iraq and Turkey. 
There are some so-called custom points run by the PKK within Iraqi territory. The 
PKK has benefited from the cigarette smuggling activities in two flows: one from 
Turkey to Iraq, the other from Iraq to Turkey. The first phase of cigarette 
smuggling—from Turkey to Iraq—occurred in the 1990s when Saddam Hussein 
was in power and the United Nations and the United States were applying 
sanctions on Iraq.   The second phase of smuggling from Iraq to Turkey started 
in the 2000s.  
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In the first stage, William Billingslea, an intelligence analyst at the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives in Washington, DC, notes that the 
PKK acquired money by smuggling U.S. cigarettes into the Iraqi market by 
collaborating with Saddam Hussein’s son. The PKK was taxing the illicit cigarette 
trade.278 The European Union v. R.J.R. Nabisco lawsuit in 2002 alleged that the 
R.J.R. Tobacco Company created false paperwork and sold cigarettes to Iraq, 
which was a violation of U.N. and U.S. sanctions. The case also alleged that the 
company directly donated large sums of money to the PKK by giving tax per 
container.279 Roth and Sever note that the case was dropped, but “the 
proceedings revealed that PKK units in northern Iraq were collecting tax on all 
cigarettes trafficked into Baghdad and the rest of Iraq.”280 
In the second stage of cigarette smuggling, Iraq has become the source 
country. The high tax rates on tobacco products make Turkey a good market. 
Roth and Sever highlight that smugglers use counterfeit tax stamps and sell 
contraband cigarettes in the Turkish retail market.281 They think that a smuggler 
can earn 60 USD per carton. Turkish Police informs that the PKK acquires 
commission from cigarette smugglers using Iraq and Iran borders. Recent 
research shows that 80 percent of the contraband cigarettes in the Turkish 
market use the eastern and southeastern borders. In 2013, the Turkish Police 
captured 108,243,473 packets of contraband cigarettes.282  
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When compared to drugs, the legality of smoking and the vast numbers of 
smokers worldwide make cigarette smuggling look less important. Some people 
choose buying contraband cigarettes due to their cheap price. Cigarette 
smuggling is a violation of custom tax regulations and causes a tax revenue loss 
for governments. However, if one considers the amount of contraband cigarettes 
in the Turkish cigarette market as 15 percent,283 the commission revenue, which 
the PKK earns via the so-called custom points in Iraq and Iran, is enormous. 
F.  MONEY LAUNDERING 
The PKK earns a significant amount of money from illegal trade, so it must 
find ways to turn them to legal earnings. Freeman observes the importance of 
cash-only trade in money laundering activities of terrorist groups.284 Most 
terrorist groups encourage their collaborators to run cash-only businesses due to 
government officials’ challenge to estimate the real revenue of the business. 
Eccarius-Kelly notes that many details are known about the PKK’s money 
laundering operations via its diaspora networks. Its collaborators run döner 
kebab restaurants, pizza shops, and legal cultural centers. She says that the 
PKK does not own large businesses; however, it has publications and holds 
effective cultural festivals.285 Laçiner notes that jewelry trade is also a known 
method the PKK applies for money laundering.286 
The PKK established several Kurdish cultural and business institutions in 
Europe with the political support of European countries. These institutions work 
as the propaganda machine of the terrorist group and also conceal its illegal 
activities. Özdemir and Pekgözlü give some examples of major Kurdish 
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organizations that regularly organize parties and festivals. During these social 
events, the PKK racketeers money as donations. The people who do not want to 
contribute are threatened.287  Behind the mask of legal donations, the PKK 
extorts money for its terrorist activities. The International Kurdish Employers 
Foundation (KARSAZ) had around 1,000 businessmen in its portfolio, and the 
organization was money laundering by manipulating the financial records of its 
members.288  
In 1996, the Belgian Police, in collaboration with Scotland Yard, held 
simultaneous operations in London, Brussels, Germany, and Luxembourg. The 
operation, Sputnik, aimed to discover the illegal financial relations between the 
PKK and Med TV Broadcasting Company. Although the company started 
broadcasting in May 1995, by the end of the summer, it collected 11 million USD 
in its bank account, which was a significant revenue. After the raid, Belgium 
Police revealed several documents on the PKK’s extortion activities in Europe 
and weapons. The PKK was laundering its money through fifteen companies.289 
Mincheva and Gurr highlight that “in February 1996 a Canadian businessman 
admitted that he had been contracted by PKK-front Med TV to launder money for 
the organization.”290 Mango points out that after Operation Sputnik, the Brussels 
prosecutor’s office convicted the PKK of laundering money, human smuggling, 
falsifying documents, drug smuggling and blackmailing people. The British 
Independent Television Commission cancelled the broadcasting license of Med 
TV in April 1999; however, the same company continued broadcasting under the 
MEDYA TV title via French satellites until 2004. After the license cancellation by 
French authorities in 2004, the company started using Danish satellites with the 
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ROJ TV title.291 In another Sputnik Operation that took place in 2002 in France, 
French and Belgian officials discovered that PKK collaborators in Europe were 
depositing the extortion money in an offshore charity account on behalf of the 
PKK.292 Ruehsen lists the charities used in money transferring for the PKK: 
• Scandinavian Kurdish Peace Council 
• Council of Solidarity with the Kurdish People in France 
• London Kurdish Relationship Group 
• Kurdistan Human Rights Project (UK) 
• Council of Say No to the War against Kurdish People 
(Belgium) 
• AKIN, a Kurdish information network (United States) 
• Kurdistan Employers’ Union or KARSAZ (Germany) 
• Kurdish Foundation Trust 
• Kurdish Association of Victoria (ongoing investigation by the 
Australian government)293 
The number of collaborators, variety of money laundering techniques, and 
the PKK’s elasticity against laws in different countries show that the PKK has a 
very well-organized, proficient criminal network in money laundering.  
G. CONCLUSION 
The PKK is responsible for the death and displacement of thousands in 
the last 30 years. The lack of a common definition of terrorism and the political 
support of European countries on behalf of the Kurdish identity have 
strengthened the PKK in years. The PKK has formed its links and organizations 
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in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and European countries. Currently, it is operating like a 
transnational company from Afghanistan to Norway. However, it is a criminal 
enterprise that controls drug trafficking on the Balkan route, extorts people, 
smuggles people and cigarettes, and launders money. These are the basic 
financial sources of the PKK. 
The PKK is a drug cartel on the Balkan route. It is possible to see the 
PKK’s contributions in different phases of the drug trade. It started the drug 
business by cultivating opium in Syrian-controlled Lebanon, then collecting 
commission from individual drug smugglers via so-called customs in Iran and 
Iraq. It has many collaborators: PJAK in Iran, criminal families in Turkey, 
immigrants, and cultural institutions in Europe. After having a network in 
European countries with immigrants and cultural and social institutions, it 
reached the power of controlling 80 percent of the drug business in Europe. 
Currently, it ships the drugs to the lucrative European market via its own courier 
system and sells in the retail market. 
The PKK extorts money from smugglers, ethnic Kurdish people in Turkey, 
and immigrants in Europe. It has discovered various ways to racketeer money: 
collecting commission, revolutionary taxes, donations, subscription fees, 
membership prices, and cultural event tickets. The people who do not want to 
give money face retaliation.  
The PKK smuggles people to European capitals for three purposes: 
earning money, employing them in its illegal activities in Europe, and forcing 
women into prostitution. It also collects commission from cigarette smugglers. 
The spirit of the crime shows it as a felony, but the amount of cigarette smuggling 
from Iraq to Turkey should not be underestimated because it is as lucrative as 
the drug business in contrast with an incomparable risk rate. 
The PKK uses its legal businesses and sociocultural institutions to 
disguise its illegal activities and their revenues. The PKK launders its illegal 
revenue by offshore accounts and in the name of donations to its pro-PKK 
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institutions. The organization is also good at falsifying the financial accounts of its 
sympathizers’ legal businesses to launder money. 
A terrorist organization cannot maintain its perpetuity without adequate 
finances. Having a common stand against criminal activities of terrorist groups in 
accordance with the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention 
may cut the financial sources of the PKK. Consequently, the collapse of the PKK 
may save ethnic Kurdish people from the PKK’s hegemony in Europe, prevent 
future addicts of drugs, raise the public’s confidence in state authority, and 
promote democracy by renouncing violence. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
Although terrorism is a major security threat to global stability and security, 
the international community has not succeeded in finding a common definition of 
terrorism or in producing corporate countering policies. Every country perceives 
terrorism in accordance with its own threats, benefits, and profits. Despite this 
challenge of the international community, most terrorist organizations have a 
strong sense of coordination with each other. They can easily exploit the 
conflicting interests of states. They are highly adept at learning new methods to 
comply with shifting environmental conditions. They invent new survival 
strategies and teach each other. Among all these survival strategies, money is 
one of the most vital for terrorist organizations. They cannot survive without 
sufficient funds. As a result, they follow two main ways to acquire enough funds: 
finding sponsoring states or involvement in the criminal world. 
With respect to these two funding sources, there is literature that suggests 
that terrorist groups share characteristics with organized crime groups. This 
thesis focuses on the work of Tamara Makarenko, an expert on organized crime 
and terrorism from the University of Saint Andrews, who has explained the nexus 
between the two by describing and illustrating a crime-terror continuum. 
According to her study, terrorist organizations apply criminal methods to fund 
themselves; similarly, criminal groups employ terrorist methods to frighten rivals 
and countering organizations. Makarenko perceives four levels of relations: 
alliance, operational tool, convergence (political crime and commercial terrorism 
hybrids), and black hole, depending on the extent of the cooperation and the 
similarity between the two groups.  
The PKK is the source of irremediable traumas in Turkey. As a result of its 
violent campaign, more than 40,000 people have lost their lives, and nearly 
400,000 people have left their locations. It has caused regional and national 
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security problems, polarized the nation politically, and financially burdened the 
developing Turkish economy.  
This study focused on the PKK’s most profitable activities and its money 
laundering. All these crimes suggest that the organization surpassed the first two 
levels of Makarenko’s crime-terror model. It acts as a “commercial terrorism”294 
group that cares more about money than its political objectives. However, 
maintaining ethnic and political discourse helps it find shelter, help, or backing 
from some states and provides cheaper labor for its criminal operations. 
Contemporarily, it is at a critical point in which it may either transform itself into a 
pure organized crime group or create a ‘black hole’ (lawless zone) for its criminal 
proceedings.   
The PKK started its activities as a pure terrorist organization. By using an 
effective political rhetoric, it did not confront any problems in finding sponsors. 
Sedat Laçiner, an international relations professor from Onsekiz Mart University, 
notes that the PKK was mostly treated as a “privileged organization”295 by some 
Western states such as Denmark, Belgium, Italy, and Germany. The organization 
used to have training camps and bases in Syria, Iran, Iraq, Greece, and Armenia. 
Laçiner states,  
According to the British MI5 reports, it is one of the bloodiest 
terrorist organizations. It means that there is no difference between 
Al Qaeda and the PKK before the Western legal system. However, 
the PKK has military bases in Iraq and propaganda offices in the 
EU capitals. The terrorist organization is probably the only terrorist 
organization that has satellite TV channel. The PKK’s Roj TV has 
been broadcasting from Denmark. It uses the Hotbird satellite.296  
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Several European countries and neighboring countries of Turkey backed 
the PKK at different levels and for various political and strategical reasons. Some 
states used the PKK as a bargaining chip and some used it as a tool to harm an 
enemy, which they otherwise could not conventionally counter. Therefore, the 
PKK has been a stunt man of cowards for years. It took years for Turkey to 
persuade some sponsoring states to cease their harmful actions. Nevertheless, 
their dubious practices gave Turkey a great opportunity to evaluate the sincerity 
of its allies and neighbors.   
While enjoying the benefits of sponsorship, the PKK mainly engaged in 
criminal activities such as drug trade, extortion, human trafficking, cigarette 
smuggling, and money laundering. Drug trading is a common way for terrorist 
organizations to fund themselves; however, the PKK proved itself as one of the 
best narco-terrorist groups. Notably, it has become a drug cartel on the Balkan 
Route. At first, the organization collaborated with Kurdish drug lords to learn the 
details of the drug business. The alliance of organized crime groups and the PKK 
satisfied both sides. For nearly a decade, they cooperated to traffic drugs from 
the Turkish-Iranian border to European countries.  
For ease and perpetuity against countering organizations, the PKK 
established several sub-organizations under different aliases. The money flowing 
from east to west was massive. To earn the maximum profit from drugs, the 
organization expanded throughout a larger area, from Afghanistan to European 
street markets, by developing its own criminal infrastructures. Then it eliminated 
its ex-collaborators and dominated the European drug market. Kurdish organized 
crime groups surrendered to the military power of the PKK. Trafficking drugs is 
not the only criminal activity of the PKK. The organization has also gained 
capabilities in cultivation and production. It encourages its sympathizers in 
Turkey to plant cannabis. The organization has heroin manufacturing laboratories 
in Iran, Turkey, and eastern European countries.   
The PKK has established its European infrastructure through Kurdish 
institutions, clubs, and associations. This network of sub-organizations has 
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worked as its recruitment offices, drug stores, hiding places, and shelters to 
mask its criminal activities. The PKK extorts mostly ethnic Kurds in several 
countries by blackmailing, life-threatening, and organizing attendance-mandatory 
cultural festivals. The organization tries to disguise the extortion by using 
different names, such as ‘commission,’ ‘revolutionary tax,’ ‘protection fee,’ 
‘membership fee,’ and ‘subscription price.’  
For the local population in eastern Turkey, smuggling has always been an 
important revenue. Therefore, the PKK initially involved itself in the smuggling 
business by extorting local smugglers. At its so-called ‘custom points’ in Iran and 
Iraq, it demanded commission from the smugglers. Later, it decided to apply its 
vast experience in drugs to smuggling goods and trafficking humans to create 
new funding sources. The transition was easy because it had already learned the 
porous points on the borderlines, tracks in the mountainous region, law 
enforcement weaknesses, distracting methods, the rules of illegal trade, and the 
points of contact. During the years of the First Gulf War, the PKK noticed the 
profit to be gained in cigarette smuggling. As a result of that, it collaborated with 
Saddam Hussein’s son to smuggle U.S. cigarettes into the Iraqi market. Since 
then, it has smuggled contraband cigarettes to the Turkish market. This is 
because the high tax rate on tobacco products in Turkey makes cigarette 
smuggling attractive. Smoking is common in Turkey. Some smokers prefer 
contraband cigarettes because of their cheapness and criminal perception. They 
think that selling or purchasing contraband cigarettes is a petty crime. Therefore, 
the organization does not face any difficulty in selling them in local markets 
thanks to its sympathizers.  
The PKK traffics people for three primary reasons. First, the organization 
earns a revenue by transferring people from eastern countries to western 
countries. It uses various routes through Turkey. The criminal network in Europe 
provides them shelter. Second, the PKK does not allow illegal immigrants to 
collapse their relations with the organization. It employs them in its criminal 
positions in Europe. Children are highly valuable for the organization. This is 
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because they have no criminal liabilities, they are easier to be employed close to 
youth attraction centers, and they are more prone to the propaganda of the 
organization. Third, the organization traffics women from eastern European 
countries to western ones. Most of the brothels in Germany and Holland belong 
to the PKK. The organization forces women into prostitution in several European 
countries.  
Godson and Williams point out a common practice of criminal 
organizations by noting, “Criminal organizations use their profits to purchase 
legitimate businesses.”297 Legal businesses allow criminal organizations to deny 
the source of their revenue and protect it against confiscation. The PKK launders 
its black money in cash-only or legal businesses. These businesses are 
generally run by PKK sympathizers in Europe. Kurdish cultural institutions and 
clubs disguise their extortion income as membership fees, subscription fees, or 
donations. The PKK successfully uses several different accounts in different 
banks to transfer and clear its tracks.    
The continuous funds, which the PKK acquires through its criminal 
operations, is the main reason for Turkey’s failure in finding a tangible solution to 
the thirty-year-long grievances. Turkey’s efforts are inadequate to cease the 
criminal activities of the organization. This is because the organization is not only 
active in Turkey. It has a web of criminal and financial links across a wide 
territory, which passes over the jurisdiction lines of Turkey. In considering the 
criminal network of the PKK, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights the 
transnational organized crime side:  
PKK/KONGRA-GEL, one of the most dangerous terrorist 
organizations in the world, is a clear example of the interconnected 
nature of terrorism and transnational organized crime. This terrorist 
network is engaged in trafficking and marketing of drugs. 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL has an established infrastructure and network 
to produce, transport and traffic opiates and cannabis throughout 
Europe. Moreover, material evidence and intelligence sources have 
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shown that the PKK/ KONGRA-GEL is also engaged in laundering 
money derived from human and drug trafficking. Therefore, Turkey 
is of the opinion that international cooperation in the fight against 
drug trafficking should also cover the cooperation and an integrated 
approach in the fight against terrorism.298 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The PKK is more a criminal threat than a security threat because it is not 
limited to Turkish borders. Vera Eccarius-Kelly, a political scientist from Siena 
College, describes the PKK as an octopus that has transnational criminal, 
political, and terrorist tentacles.299 These terrorist tentacles are mostly active in 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.  
To immunize itself against the sanctions of the international community, 
the PKK has made a habit out of changing letters and words in its name. One 
can argue that the organization is very well aware of the states’ bureaucracies, 
political games, and international relations. For its sub-organizations in different 
countries, it has established an umbrella organization, the Group of Communities 
in Kurdistan (KCK). The supreme leader of the KCK is the PKK’s jailed leader, 
Abdullah Öcalan. However, it is practically led by the PKK’s second in command, 
Murat Karayılan. PJAK in Iran, PKK in Turkey, PÇDK in Iraq, and PYD in Syria 
are all branches of the KCK that are ruled by Öcalan.300  
The organization’s criminal and political tentacles stretch from Iran to 
Europe. Francois Haut claims that “the PKK has set up as a system the 
methodical exploitation of Europe considering it the means tank fueling its 
‘cause.’”301 The organization earns most of its annual revenue from its illegal 
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activities in Europe, and it has gotten political backing from European 
communities. Although the European Union designated the PKK as a terrorist 
organization, the 30-year experience in the fight against PKK terrorism shows 
that European communities have poor political will to cease the activities of the 
PKK in European jurisdiction. For a recent example, on November 12, 2015, 
Zübeyir Aydar, one of the high ranking leaders of the PKK, gave a speech in a 
conference at the National Assembly of France.302 He was designated as one of 
the “significant foreign narcotics traffickers”303 by the U.S. Treasury in 2009 and 
is currently a wanted terrorist by Turkey with an award of 1.4 million USD.304 As 
it can be seen, not only foot soldiers, but also high ranking members of the PKK 
can freely act in Europe and give speeches at the French Parliament without any 
fear of capture.    
At the foreword of Turkey and The War on Terror: For Forty Years We 
Fought Alone, Andrew Mango, who is a British historian, emphasizes the 
loneliness of Turkey in the fight against terrorism. He notes:  
Until President George W. Bush declared his war on terror, Turkish 
efforts to fight terrorists enjoyed little sympathy in the West. 
Comments were mostly focused on the justifications advanced by 
terrorists and on complaints that human rights were violated in the 
course of anti-terrorist operations.305 
In spite of the European tolerance for the PKK’s political mask, the 
criminal PKK poses a greater risk to Europe than it does in Turkey. This is 
because Turkey is a transit country for many of the PKK’s criminal activities and 
Europe is the destination of its all criminal proceedings. Şule Toktaş and Hande 
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Selimoğlu, political scientists at Kadir Has University, argue that eliminating 
transnational organized crime is a prerequisite for establishing European Union 
values like “human rights, justice, equality, democracy, freedom, rule of law, and 
preserving peace and stability.”306 David M. Luna, director of Anti-Crime 
Programs at the U.S. Department of State, points out a different aspect by 
saying, “interlinked illicit threats not only undermine the integrity of vital 
governmental institutions meant to protect peace and security, but cost 
economies tax revenue and jobs, and promote a culture of impunity.”307 
Therefore, the countries that are not convinced by the PKK’s terrorism side 
should be aware of the commercial side of the organization. The countries should 
honor the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; otherwise, 
they should understand that their so-called political vigilance is promoting the 
statute of unlawfulness. Covertly backing the PKK is supporting racketeering, 
mafias, prostitution, forced labor, slavery, drugs, child kidnappings and 12-year 
old children holding AK-47s at arms.308 Promoting democracy and human rights 
can only be achieved by eliminating terrorism and transnational organized crime 
and providing justice.  
In order to fight effectively against transnational organized crime (TOC), 
countries need to achieve five critical goals: a determined approach against 
TOC, international cooperation and coordination, sharing information, education, 
and economical precautions. 
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1. Standing Firm against Security Threats 
States should have a deciduous stance against transnational organized 
crime threats, which they failed to show against terrorism. Terrorists, freedom 
fighters, revolutionaries, guerillas, and militias are all unique words, but are 
synonyms in the terrorism terminology. Policy makers choose one of them in 
accordance with their own benefits. The use of these words creates vicious 
cycles in international relations and prevents peace. However, crime is crime in 
most places. Crime cannot be justified by political goals. Countries can easily 
reach a consensus about preventing crimes.  
The stance of the United States toward terrorism in 2001 served as a 
good model to the remaining part of the world. Thomas Sanderson notes that, 
“U.S. pressures on nations to participate in the global war on terrorism: many 
states that might otherwise turn a blind eye to organized crime now feel 
compelled to pursue terrorists.”309  
In 2011, the U.S. presidency released the Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime. According to this strategy report, the White 
House summarizes its key objectives as follows: 
• Protect Americans and our partners from the harm, violence, 
and exploitation of transnational criminal networks. 
• Help partner countries strengthen governance and 
transparency, break the corruptive power of transnational 
criminal networks, and sever state-crime alliances.  
• Break the economic power of transnational criminal networks 
and protect strategic markets and the U.S. financial system 
from TOC penetration and abuse.  
• Defeat transnational criminal networks that pose the greatest 
threat to national security by targeting their infrastructures, 
depriving them of their enabling means, and preventing the 
criminal facilitation of terrorist activities.  
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• Build international consensus, multilateral cooperation, and 
public-private partnerships to defeat transnational organized 
crime.310 
With this report, the U.S. government took responsibility for preventing 
transnational criminal networks not only against America, but also its partners. 
The United States and Turkey have had close relationships and common 
commitments since the 1940s. As the leader in many areas, the United States is 
expected to continue its mission and encourage other states to fight against 
terrorists and transnational organized crime groups. 
After 2006, Iraq and Syria’s respective power vacuums led to the 
emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a fundamentalist terrorist 
organization. The United States and some other Western democracies are now 
supporting PYD in Syria against ISIS. However, the PYD is an organization that 
is aligned with the PKK. They belong to the KCK and get direct orders from 
Abdullah Ocalan. Patrick Cockburn, a commentator and journalist from The 
Independent, reports that “The PKK for the first time holds power in a quasi-state 
in north-east Syria which has U.S. military backing and increasingly warm 
relations with Russia.”311 Although Western policy makers try to differentiate the 
PYD from the PKK, it is obvious that the organization is fulfilling the instructions 
of Abdullah Öcalan, who the United States helped Turkey to capture in Nairobi in 
1999.312 The paradoxical approach of the United States seems to be a source of 
distrust between the two communities in future. 
ISIS is a serious security threat; however, the virtuous people are still 
stronger than the ISIS terrorists. Therefore, the precautions and solutions must 
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be compatible with the moral values. Supporting a terrorist group to combat 
another is not a legitimate or appropriate option. States have militaries, fighter 
aircrafts, ships, intelligence units, and diplomatic capabilities. They do not need 
hired guns. It is not a completely fitting analogy; however, the U.S. self-criticism 
about the support that they provided to Mujahedeen in Afghanistan is noteworthy 
because rapid decisions may create further security and criminal problems in the 
Middle East. Former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told 
Congress: 
We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. I 
mean, let’s remember here: The people we are fighting today we 
funded 20 years ago. And we did it because we were locked in 
this struggle with the Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan, 
and we did not want to see them control central Asia, and we went 
to work, and it was President Reagan, in partnership with the 
Congress, led by Democrats, who said, “You know what? Sounds 
like a pretty good idea! Let’s deal with the ISI and the Pakistani 
military, and let’s go recruit these Mujahedin! That’s great! Let’s get 
some to come from Saudi Arabia and other places, importing their 
Wahhabi brand of Islam, so that we can go beat the Soviet Union!” 
And guess what? They retreated, they lost billions of dollars, and it 
led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. So there’s a very strong 
argument, which is: It wasn’t a bad investment to end the Soviet 
Union, but let’s be careful what we sow, because we will 
harvest. So we then left Pakistan. We said, “OK, fine. You deal 
with the Stingers that we’ve left all over your country. You deal with 
the mines that are along the border. And by the way, we don’t want 
to have anything to do with you. In fact, we’re sanctioning you.” So 
we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military, and with ISI, and we 
now are making up for a lot of lost time.313  
For the last five years, Turkey has attempted to use negotiations to put an 
end to the PKK’s terrorism. Nevertheless, the PKK’s preparations during the 
negotiation talks, which have been revealed by its sudden raids and bombings 
against military posts, police officers, and civilians, demonstrates that the 
organization has never had a will to finish its violent campaign. This is because 
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the PKK is a criminal organization as well as a terrorist one. Trying to negotiate 
with it just only strengthens its confidence and increases its popularity. 
Negotiation will probably boost its violence and profit campaign. Rosenthal 
argues that the governments of Colombia and Sierra Leone made mistake by 
negotiating with for-profit groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. 
She notes,  
When governments are fooled into negotiating with for-profit 
terrorists as political actors, they inevitably make mistakes. One of 
the turning points for FARC was when the former president of 
Colombia [Andres Pastrana] gave the group control of 42,000 
square kilometers of land during the peace talks begun at the end 
of the 1990s. Not surprisingly, this increased territorial control 
allowed FARC to solidify its drug business and its profits; it was not 
until after the 2000 accord that FARC enacted Law 002. This also 
coincided with FARC’s dividing itself into seven units to formalize its 
enterprise. At least two of these divisions now operate almost solely 
in the fashion of drug cartels. Although the land offering was later 
rescinded because it was obvious FARC had used the negotiations 
only as a means of increasing its profits, by then it was too late. 
The success of the terrorist group’s drug operations, the loss of 
ideological efficacy and the inadvertent aid of the government 
turned FARC into a group more involved and motivated by 
continued financial gain than ideological revolution. No matter how 
the group may wish to view itself, reality reflects the overwhelming 
drive to sustain and even expand its profit base.314 
The PKK is a commercial terrorism group, and governments should solve 
the problem in accordance with the group’s genuine motives. Bargaining with 
criminals may criminalize more people in the future. The PKK is a group that 
often changes its political objectives, and it has been difficult for governments to 
satisfy its needs. It uses the negotiation process to gain political and diplomatic 
ground in the world and backing for its criminal enterprise. It does not want 
peace; peace is a threat to its existence. If peace happens inadvertently, it looks 
for ways to break it. As Rosenthal concludes,  
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The more they are viewed as a destructive criminal influence, by 
both the government and the population, the easier it will be to 
undermine them. Governments do not negotiate territorial 
settlements with criminals. Governments do not negotiate peace 
settlements with criminals. Governments arrest criminals.315 
2. International Cooperation 
Luna states that the world can succeed against transnational organized 
crime and terrorism if it can establish “fighting networks”316 against criminal 
networks. As  previously mentioned, terrorist and criminal organizations are 
highly capable of adapting themselves. They can easily change their traditional 
structures. Oscar Palma, a professor at Universidad del Rosario in Colombia, 
notes that terrorists expand their networks beyond their primary targets’ borders 
in order to avoid the limitations of a single state and collaborate with other 
terrorists in their regions.317 He also points out the network theory, which 
suggests that “structures can survive unless 5–15% of hubs are disabled 
simultaneously.”318 Therefore, raids against commercial terrorists must 
simultaneously target their military, financial, and political wings. Otherwise, the 
organization can regenerate itself several times like a lizard that loses its tail. 
Former Turkish Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ states that the PKK has been 
defeated militarily at least five times since 1984.319 However, thanks to its 
financial and political wings in multiple places, the organization managed to 
recruit new people and continued its destabilizing project in Turkey.  
                                            
315 Rosenthal, “For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs,” 494. 
316 Luna, “Threat Convergence: Subversion, Destabilization, and Insecurity.” 
317 Oscar Palma, “Transnational Networks of Insurgency and Crime: Explaining the Spread 
of Commercial Insurgencies Beyond State Borders,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 3 (2015), 
477. 
318 Ibid., 491. 




The strikes against transnational organized crime groups must be 
coordinated between countries. Every country should contribute their efforts in all 
aspects against the common enemy of humanity. Godson states:  
As transnational organized crime has become ubiquitous, devising, 
and implementing effective counter measures has become an 
international security imperative. Independent national responses 
will not suffice… the response needs to be extensive in scope, 
multilateral in form, to the extent possible, global in reach.320  
By taking coordinated actions against TOCs, countries can provide a 
better and securer environment for their citizens. Otherwise, a threat that seems 
far would not take long to threaten them in future. 
3. Sharing Information 
An important and possible type of cooperation is sharing information 
between countries. Expecting every country to have the same experience in 
countering TOC policies and knowledge about all worldwide groups is utopian. 
Therefore, international mechanisms should provide countries with a common 
ground to rapidly share their experiences. The UN can introduce a list of 
transnational organized crime groups. By doing so, every member of the UN can 
identify transnational criminal groups and the UN can compel its members to act 
in accordance with its conventions and protocols, which they signed. 
Transnational organized crime groups use some countries as their 
“service states,”321 which provide them strict banking privacy, low tax rates, and 
unlimited reach to the global banking system. These countries give them the 
opportunity to launder their money and keep it in safety. Sheltering criminals by 
providing them safe vaults and trying to catch them is a tragic irony. 
Transparency International, a non-governmental organization to fight against 
corruption, expresses this dilemma by reporting:   
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Financial institutions should be fully cooperative in official 
investigations to combat money laundering, such as from funds 
linked to stolen assets. Once stolen assets have been placed in the 
banking system, recovery is extremely complex. It can be difficult to 
locate funds concealed in a web of multiple accounts with multiple 
layers of secrecy. Freezing assets that have been identified as 
stolen can be slow. In addition, cross-jurisdictional investigations 
can be challenging and expensive. It is estimated that 99 per cent 
of illicit funds remain undetected and 0.2 per cent of all funds 
uncovered have been seized.322 
Therefore, countries that have stricter privacy policies should make them 
more transparent. Being cooperative with and equal to all international judicial 
warrants can restrict the room for criminals and on the contrary expands the 
reach of law.  
4. Education 
Education is another dimension of the fight against transnational 
organized crime and terrorism. When one considers the recruitment pool of the 
PKK, it can be seen that most of the members are young, uneducated, 
unemployed, and anti-social.323 Most of them see working for the organization as 
a well-paid job. The organization also provides them some level of socialization. 
Individuals who were neglected in their families or communities are also good 
candidates for the PKK’s fronts. Education is a long, but an absolute solution to 
the criminality problem. 
In Turkey, education can be achieved in four main segments: formal 
education, mass-media education, religious education, and constantly reporting. 
To defeat the effects of illiteracy, Turkey should reform its national education 
programs to decrease the tendency towards bad habits and criminality. For older 
citizens, the best way is mass-media education. Government should encourage 
                                            
322 Transparency International, Incentivising Integrity in Banks (Working Paper # 02/2015) 
(Berlin: Transparency International, July 30, 2015), 6. 
323 Süleyman Özeren, Alper Sözer and Oğuzhan Başıbüyük, “A Field Study on Factors that 
Affect Individuals’ Decision to Join the Terrorist Organization: The PKK/KCK Case,” International 
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or subsidize researchers and film producers to document the facts about the 
transnational organized crime and terrorist groups. They can produce 
documentaries or film series for popular consumption. The PKK is highly skilled 
at propagandizing via social media and satellite television programs. Therefore, 
the educational measures must be competent to show every citizen the crimes 
that the PKK is committing. Mass-media education can diminish smuggling, 
human trafficking, and opium or cannabis cultivation. The education can inform 
people about the threats and encourage them to report people who are 
collaborating in these kinds of illegal activities.   
The people that are constantly abused by the PKK mostly claim to be 
religious Muslims. The Friday sermons are good opportunities to reach local 
men. They can be informed about the harms of drugs, the wrath of people who 
are trafficked and forced to criminality or prostitution, the harms of tax fraud, the 
harms of contraband cigarettes, and the virtues of a legal life.  
Turkish authorities are publishing their documents mostly in Turkish. Due 
to this language barrier, international scholars cannot use Turkish sources and 
experiences. Therefore, the research on the PKK is not proportional to the threat 
it poses against the international community. Turkish authorities also must 
release their findings in other languages. 
5. Economic Precautions 
Bribery and life threats are the most effective tools of organized crime 
groups against countering organizations. By considering the Balkans after the 
Yugoslavia era, Sanderson indicates “poorly equipped and underpaid border 
guards”324 as one of the thriving factors of transnational organized crime. 
Because of this, smugglers and traffickers earn huge amounts from illegal trade. 
They try to attract law enforcement and customs officials by offering ‘big money.’ 
Mincheva and Gurr note that the corruption level in surrounding states (Iraq, 
                                            
324 Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” 
57. 
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Syria, Iran, Armenia, Bulgaria) has been an important factor for the PKK’s 
survival.325 Turkey’s corruption level is way below the regional standards. 
However, the PKK uses many countries as transit countries for its illegal 
operations.  
The wages for government officials must be satisfactory to keep them in 
ethical borders. Awardings for successful personnel should be competitive. 
Annual awarding amounts should be anonymously publicly announced. To 
respond to the PKK, Turkey should reform its anti-smuggling law. Adopting more 
punitive laws against smugglers may be more of a deterrent. Currently, Turkey 
awards both informers and capturers about smuggling cases. However, the law 
limits the awarding amount for individual officials. The maximum amount an 
official can get cannot exceed approximately 4,000 USD annually.326 The level of 
the award is not much when it is compared with possible offers. Increasing or 
abolishing the annual limit may be more rational and motivational.  
Ways to improve the effectiveness of the current border regime is an area 
of possible future research. Increasing the number of custom points between 
Turkey and its eastern neighbors can decrease the volume of the current border 
gates. Turkey should equip its southern and eastern borders with more 
technological innovations like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and automated 
gun systems. These systems may help law enforcement units control the multiple 
tracks in the mountainous terrain.  
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C. LAST WORDS 
David M. Luna points out that “fighting terrorism must go in hand with 
fighting transnational organized crime.”327 The PKK, as a transnational organized 
crime group, not only threatens the stability of Turkey, but also threatens 
humanity even in very remote areas from its target country. The organization has 
a vague political motive; however, its economic motives are obvious. The best 
way to defeat transnational organized crime groups is to defend the rule of law 
and stand firm against them. If the international community can collectively gain 
this approach, no illegal organization can survive and hide itself from justice. 
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